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"We must not rest until all children who have been re-
cruited or used in violation of international law have been
released, and until all children feel safe in their homes,
schools and communities, without fear that they will be
forced into war. "
-United Nations Secretary-General
Ban Ki Moon, 20091
I. INTRODUCTION
Children are the greatest casualties of war. Domestic and
international laws have long singled out children as a specially
protected group of persons, recognizing that children lack the
autonomy afforded by an adult's developed capacity for self-
1. Sarah Shatz, U.N. Secretary General Pledges to 'Stamp Out' the Use
of Child Soldiers, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Fed. 13, 2009), http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/13/un-secretary-general-pledges-stamp-
out-use-child-soldiers.
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protection, decision-making, responsibility, and accountability.
John Stuart Mill's theory of liberal utilitarianism famously ac-
knowledges this in On Liberty, when he proposes special treat-
ment for children, who "must be protected against their own
actions as well as against external injury."* This premise reso-
nates most significantly in the laws of war, where children en-
joy dual protections, first as civilians,3 and second as a special
class of protected persons.4
A. International Law Prohibitions on Child Soldiering
The forcible conscription of children to serve as child
soldiers in armed conflicts violates every norm of protection in
international human rights and humanitarian law.5 While the
1949 Geneva Conventions do not contain specific norms deal-
ing with the phenomenon of children as combatants, Article
77 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
("Protocol I") explicitly requires parties to an international
armed conflict to:
[T]ake all feasible measures in order that children
who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not
take a direct part in hostilities and, in particular, they
shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed
forces. In recruiting among those persons who have
attained the age of fifteen years but who have not at-
tained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the
2. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 81 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003).
3. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Common Article 3]; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 13-14, 24, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter G C IV].
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), art. 77, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3[hereinafter, Protocol I];
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Pro-
tocol II), art. 4, June 8, 1977, 11 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol II].
5. See generally JENNY KUPER, MILITARY TRAINING AND CHILDREN IN ARMED
CONFLIcr: LAw, POLICY, AND PRACTIcE 45-57 (2005); MATTHEW HAPPOLD,
CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 54-118 (2005).
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conflict shall endeavour to give priority to those who
are oldest.6
Article 4(3) (c) of the Second Additional Protocol to the
Geneva Conventions ("Protocol II") similarly binds parties to a
non-international armed conflict to observe that "children
who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take
part in hostilities."7 Children between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen who take part in hostilities possess the status of com-
batants. As combatants, these children are entitled upon cap-
ture to the Third Geneva Convention ("GC III") privileges af-
forded to prisoners of war, with some additional favorable
treatment on account of their age.8 Neither can child combat-
ants be subjected to the death penalty for any offence related
to armed conflict, where they are below eighteen years of age
at the time the offence was committed.9 Where children be-
low the age of fifteen years are captured while taking a direct
part in hostilities, they remain subject to special protection re-
gardless of any dispute over their prisoner of war status.10
Notwithstanding the presence of armed conflict, children
are entitled to the fullest possible range of protections and en-
tidements accorded them under international human rights
law. Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC") specifically addresses the issue of child participation
in armed conflict, and accordingly mandates states parties to
"respect and to ensure respect for rules of international hu-
manitarian law applicable to [states parties] in armed conflicts
which are relevant to the child"; "take all feasible measures to
ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen
years do not take a direct part in hostilities"; "refrain from
recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen
years into their armed forces"; "give priority to those who are
oldest" in recruiting children between the ages of fifteen and
eighteen"; and "take all feasible measures to ensure protection
6. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 77.
7. Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 77.
8. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
arts. 16, 49, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC
III].
9. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 77(5).
10. Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 77(3).
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and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict."'1
Following the conclusion of armed conflicts, states continue to
have duties to "take all appropriate measures to promote phys-
ical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a
child victim of any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse, tor-
ture or any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, or armed conflicts."1 2
Among many of the CRC's fundamental rights, those
most applicable to the circumstances faced by child soldiers
include: (1) "the right of the child to be protected from eco-
nomic exploitation and from performing any work that is
likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's educa-
tion, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical, mental,
spiritual, moral or social development";1 3 as well as the duties
of states to (2) "prevent the use of children in the illicit pro-
duction and trafficking of [narcotic drugs and psychotropic]
substances"; 14 (3) protect children against sexual exploitation,
sexual abuse,' and all other forms of exploitation prejudicial
to the child's welfare;16 (4) prevent the sale and trafficking of
children; 17 and (5) to ensure treatment of the child with hu-
manity and respect for inherent dignity of a human person,
"taking into account the needs of persons of his or her age."18
The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Involvement of Chil-
dren in Armed Conflict more extensively implements these
protections by requiring states to: (1) ensure that the mem-
bers of their armed forces under eighteen years of age do not
take a direct part in hostilities; (2) raise the minimum age for
voluntary recruitment into the armed forces from fifteen to
eighteen years of age; (3) ban compulsory recruitment of per-
sons below the age of eighteen; and (4) prohibit independent
armed groups within their territories from recruiting persons
11. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A.Res. 44/
25, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess. Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc A/44/49,
art. 38 (1989) (entered into force Sept.2, 1990).
12. Id. art. 39.
13. Id. art. 32(1).
14. Id. art. 33.
15. Id. art. 34.
16. Id. art. 36.
17. Id. art. 35.
18. Id. art. 37.
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below eighteen.19 To date, there are 139 states parties to this
Optional Protocol.2 0
Child soldier enlistment is now subject to international
criminal prosecution. Admittedly, neither the statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY') nor that of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR") explicitly mention the crime of child soldier
enlistment. However, subsequent international tribunals have
since recognized child soldier enlistment as a war crime. The
first international judgment on child recruitment began with
the May 2004 decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in the Hinga Norman case.21 In Hinga
Norman, the Appeals Chamber defined child recruitment as
the conscription, enlistment, and use of children under 15
years of age to participate in hostilities. According to the Ap-
peals Chamber, these activities had already been outlawed
under customary international law since at least 1996.22 A year
later, the International Criminal Court ("ICC") included the
crime of child soldier enlistment in its first set of arrest war-
rants, issued against members of the Lord's Resistance Army
("LRA") in Uganda23 and members of armed groups in the
Democratic Republic of Congo ("DRC").24 On January 26,
2009, the ICC commenced trial in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga
19. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I,
U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess. Supp. No. 49 (Vol.111), U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (Vol. III),
at 7 (May 25, 2000), (entered into force Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Op-
tional Protocol on the Rights of the Child].
20. Status of Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-1 1-b&chapter=4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
21. Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E),
Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Re-
cruitment) (May 31, 2004).
22. Alison Smith, Child Recruitment and the Special Court of Sierra Leone, 2J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1141, 1141 (2004).
23. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, & Do-
minic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-4)1/05-53, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph
Kony, 1 42.5, 13 (Pre-Trial Chamber II Sept. 27, 2005).
24. Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant
of Arrest, para. 12 (i)-(iii) (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Aug. 22, 2006); Prosecutor
v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-1/04-01/
07, Warrant of Arrest, para. 22(v) (Pre-Trial Chamber I, July 2, 2007).
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Dyilo, where the accused is charged with "enlisting and con-
scripting of children under the age of 15 years into the Forces
patriotiques pour la liberation du Congo [Patriotic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo] ("FPLC") and using them to participate
actively in hostilities in the context of an international armed
conflict from early September 2002 to 2 June 2003,"25 and of
"enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years
into the FPLC and using them to participate actively in hostili-
ties in the context of an armed conflict not of an international
character from 2 June 2003 to 13 August 2003."26
B. Child Soldiering and Child Labor
As officially defined, child soldiering encompasses not
only direct combat participation, but all modes of participa-
tion in armed groups' activities in their conduct and prosecu-
tion of armed conflicts. The 1997 Cape Town Principles and
Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed
Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of
Child Soldiers in Africa ("Cape Town Principles") explicitly
defines a child soldier as "any person under 18 years of age
who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force in
any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, mes-
sengers, and those accompanying such groups, other than purely
as family members. It includes girls recruited for sexual pur-
poses and forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to
a child who is carrying or has carried arms."27 This definition
recognizes the wide scope of conflict-related activities for
which armed groups put children to use, as first narrated in
the groundbreaking 1996 Report of Graga Machel to the U.N.
25. Summary of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo - ICC-1/04-01/06,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situa-
tions%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20
cases/icc%200104%200106/democratic%20republic%20of%2Othe%20
congo?lan=en-GB (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
26. Id. See also Use of Child Soldiers 'Particularly Abusive,' UN Expert Testifies,
UN NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewslD=33418.
27. Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the
Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child
Soldiers in Africa, Apr. 27-30, 1997, Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, 12,
available at http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/CapeTownPrinciples(1).
pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Cape Town Principles].
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General Assembly on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Chil-
dren.28 The International Labour Organization (ILO) like-
wise acknowledges the definitional nexus between child sol-
diering and child labor. Accordingly, the ILO categorizes
child soldiering as among the "worst forms of child labor" in
ILO Convention No. 182,29 an international treaty ratified by
about 165 states,30 and which obligates states parties to take
preventive and remedial measures against such worst forms of
child labor.
According to the 2008 Child Soldiers Global Report
("CSG Report"), despite the increased internationalization of
legal protections to prevent child soldiering, tens of thousands
(although possibly reduced from initial estimates of around
300,000 in 2001) of child soldiers continue to be actively in-
volved in armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Burundi, Central Af-
rican Republic, Chad, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, the DRC, In-
dia, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Thailand, and Uganda.31 The decrease in child sol-
diering might be attributed, in some degree, to the collective
efforts of international institutions. From 1999 to 2005, the
U.N. Security Council passed Resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314
(2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004) and 1612
(2005), which collectively outline a system of mechanisms and
programs for country-specific and region-specific fact-finding,
reportorial, periodic review, support, and monitoring of
States' compliance with international obligations on child sol-
28. U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Chil-
dren, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) (Report of Graca Machel).
29. Int'l Lab. Org. [ILO], Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immedi-
ate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, art. 3 (a), ILO
Convention No. 182 (June 17, 1999) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 182].
30. Ratification and promotion of fundamental ILO Conventions, ILO,
Comm. on Legal Issues and Int'l Labour Standards, 300th Sess., Nov. 2007,
15, GB.300/LILS/7.
31. COALTION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS
GLOBAL REPORT 2008, at 14, 389-407 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 CSG REPORT];
COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, CHILD SOLDIERS GLOBAL
REPORT 2001, at 10 (2001) (estimating 300,000 child soldiers in more than
thirty countries at any given time).
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diering.Y During the 2003 "Children in the Crossfire" Confer-
ence organized by the ILO, then ILO Director General Juan
Somavia proposed a three-point battle plan to prevent and
end the use of children in armed conflict:
1) [i]mproving enforcement to go beyond conven-
tions and laws. Awareness raising, adopting and im-
plementing legislation in policies and practice are
key elements;
2) [d]eveloping practical, targeted strategies to help
children overcome their trauma and prepare for a
better future, such as counselling, education, voca-
tional training, assistance to parents to boost incomes
and get decent jobs; and
3) [a] development strategy to get at the root causes,
including promoting social and economic recon-
struction, poverty eradication, employment, and edu-
cation policies.33
In 2007, seventy-six states, which included conflict-ridden
countries, committed themselves under the Paris Commit-
ments and Paris Guidelines to observe common guidelines on
the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of
all categories of children associated with armed groups.34 A
2009 report of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers
indicates, however, that DDR strategies have not entirely been
successful to date in stopping the re-recruitment of former
child soldiers, much less in preventing their use for other con-
flict-related activities such as artisanal mining. 5
32. See S.C. Res. 1261, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1261 (Aug. 25, 1999); S.C. Res.
1314, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1314 (Aug. 11, 2000); S.C. Res. 1379, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1379 (Nov. 20, 2001); S.C. Res. 1460, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1460 (Jan. 30,
2003); S.C. Res. 1539, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1539 (Apr. 22, 2004); S.C. Res.
1612, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (July 26, 2005).
33. ILO Concern: The Unbearable Fate of Child Soldiers, INTERNATIONAL LA-
BOR ORGANIZATION, May 23, 2003, available at http://www.ilo.org/global/
AbouttheILO/Media-and-public-information/Feature-stories/lang-
en/WCMS 075611/index.htm.
34. See U.N. Children's Fund [UNICEF], The Paris Principles: The Principles
and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Feb.
2007); The Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use
by Armed Forces or Armed Groups, Feb. 5-6, 2007.
35. International Interdisciplinary Conference on Rehabilitation and Re-
integration of War-Affected Children, Oct. 22-23, 2009, Coalition to Stop the
Use of Child Soldiers, Release and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: One Part of a
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Despite the wide net of international legal prohibitions
now operative and the direct involvement of top-tier interna-
tional organizations and institutions seized of the matter, 3 6
child soldiering remains a persistent practice in many ongoing
armed conflicts around the world. The 2008 CSG Report ob-
serves that while some progress has been made in reducing the
incidence of child soldiering from the end of conflicts in An-
gola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and the signing of peace
agreements in Burundi, C6te d'Ivoire, the DRC, Nepal, and
Southern Sudan,37 children continue to be recruited and used
by paramilitaries, militias, civilian defense forces, or armed
groups linked to, supported by, or acting as proxies for gov-
ernments in Chad, Colombia, Myanmar, Peru, the Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, India, Iran, Libya, the DRC, and
C6te d'Ivoire.3 8 All of the previously discussed international
instruments comprehensively propose long-term strategies to
reduce the incidence of child soldiering, but they are by no
means complete. The gravitas of most of these measures lies in
the legal formalization of prohibitions, but is contingent on
states' individual modes of implementation of the interna-
tional prohibitions against child soldiering. Likewise, the na-
ture and scale of the internal or international armed conflicts
prevailing will also affect the method and capability of a state
to enforce such international prohibitions against child sol-
diering. In a situation where both government armed forces
and non-state armed groups are known to have enlisted child
soldiers, it is difficult to see how the international prohibitions
Bigger Puzzle 1 (unpublished report), available at http://www.child-soldiers.
org/document/get?id=1584.
36. See, e.g., Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in
Emergency and Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 3318 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631
(Dec. 14, 1974); U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 28; Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 144, UN
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, Sales No. E.03.V.2 (2002); United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], Montevideo Declaration on
the Use of Children as Soldiers (July 8, 1999); Cape Town Principles, supra note 27;
Organization of African Unity [OAU], Resolution Of The Plight of African
Children in Situation of Armed Conflicts, CM/RES.1659 (LXIV) REV.1,
64th Sess., July 1-5, 1996; OAU, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child, OAU. Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29,
1999).
37. 2008 CSG REPORT, supra note 31, at 23.
38. Id. at 18.
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will be implemented fully and effectively without ultimately
having to fall back on the self-imposed restraint of the combat-
ing groups.
The continued proliferation of child soldiering evidences
a fundamental disconnect between the root causes of child sol-
diering and the current range of international mechanisms
and strategies used. Criminal prosecutions and international
legal sanctions, while laudable, will likely have an attenuated
effect on reducing the incidence of child soldiering in armed
conflicts across the globe. These measures operate on an ex
post paradigm, 39 and do little to cripple the immediate opera-
tional network and policy considerations of field commanders
or armed groups that do enlist child soldiers. As the 2008 CSG
Report acknowledges, "some armed groups and their leaders
appear to attach little value to international law and display
little inclination to adhere to it. The military imperatives of
the group and the political, economic, and social factors that
drive conflicts and cause children to enlist-often under-
pinned by local cultural attitudes towards the age of major-
ity-can outweigh legal and moral arguments."40 Due to their
malleability in assuming either direct combatant or logistical
support roles, and with their unique psychological attributes,
armed groups deliberately enlist child soldiers to advance
short-term or immediate military objectives.41 One author
notes that "[d]epending on the context, child soldiers may
serve as sentries, bodyguards, porters, domestic labourers,
medics, guards, sex slaves, spies, cooks, mine sweepers, or
recruiters. Roles may vary significantly by age and gender. For
example, smaller, younger children often serve as spies. Girl
soldiers perform the same wide variety of roles performed by
boy soldiers, and in African countries commanders frequently
seek girls because of their impressive capacities for portaging
39. See generally James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and
the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 ViLL. L. REv. 1, 10-19
(2009); Benedetto Croce, Against International Post-War Tribunals, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1029 (2007); Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of International
Criminal Prosecutions in Africa, 31 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 343 (2008).
40. 2008 CSG REPORT, supra note 31, at 24.
41. Cf Susan Tiefenbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery, and the Trafficking of Chil-
dren, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 415, 431-33 (2008) (explaining that children
may join an armed group for socio-psychological reasons, and armed groups
may seek child soldiers for reasons pertaining to economic efficiency).
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heavy loads. Girl soldiers also are frequently sought for pur-
poses of sexual exploitation, as are boys in some contexts."42
At any given moment, and depending on the armed group's
operational needs, a child soldier can be exploited for virtually
every imaginable form of child labor. This is precisely why the
Cape Town Principles do not limit the definition of child sol-
diering to direct combat participation or carrying of arms.
With these considerations in mind, I propose a comple-
mentary strategy to existing international approaches to stop
child soldiering. Apart from targeting the grassroots causes of
child soldiering and facilitating the demobilization and reinte-
gration of child soldiers to their respective communities after
the cessation of hostilities, I propose that we also consider the
use of current international economic norms to permit states
to specifically discriminate against and target the economic
structures that incentivize armed groups to use, and continue
using, child soldiers. As previously discussed, child soldiering
is, in practice, a euphemism for a broad range of activities that
children may be compelled to undertake in armed conflicts.
While children may be particularly useful on the frontlines
wielding contemporary light weapons (such as M16 and AK-47
assault rifles), hand grenades, landmines, and other cheap
and widely available explosives, 43 their physical attributes and
aptitude for learning skills are equally advantageous for eco-
nomic activities which are contemporaneously undertaken to
finance the operations of armed groups.4 4 In modem armed
conflicts, these economic activities can include diamond, oil,
and other forms of natural resource mining,45 opium and coca
42. MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION
8 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
43. ALCINDA HONWANA, CHILD SOLDIERS IN AFIncA 31 (2006); cf Strong
Link Between Child Soldiers and the Small Arms Trade, UN Experts Say, UN NEws
CENTRE (July 15, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewslD=27382&Cr-child&Crl =soldier (explaining that the small arms
trade has grown as child soldiering has increased).
44. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 41, at 432-33.
45. See Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, Impact on Children of Illicit Exploitation of Natu-
ral Resources in Conflict Zones, UN.ORc ("There is often also close interlinkage
with other lucrative and mainly illicit trade such as in weapons and drugs,
which serves to fuel and prolong conflict. Beyond conscription as soldiers
and other categories of grave violations, children may also be forced to la-
bour in mining activities or be exposed to criminal networks engaged in
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cultivation, 46 and drug trafficking.47 From the time a child is
recruited into an armed group, he or she is vulnerable to as-
suming interchangeable roles as a direct combatant in the hos-
tilities, or as a forced participant in the economic activities that
finance and sustain the armed group's capability to wage war.
In order to truly give effect to international legal responsibili-
ties of prevention against child soldiering, states must also take
measures to ensure that they do not accept or facilitate the
entry into their territories of child soldier-produced, -distrib-
uted, and/or -trafficked goods that benefit and finance armed
groups.
Part II examines the financing of contemporary armed
groups through trade of both facially licit goods (such as
diamonds, gold, minerals, oil, and other natural resources),
and prohibited substances such as opium and cocaine. I show that
international regulation to enforce bans on both types of
goods qualitatively differ in terms of scope, the binding nature
child trafficking."), available at http://www.un.org/children/conflict/en-
glish/exploitation.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2011); 2008 CSG Report, supra
note 31, at 213 ("The majority of former combatants were still unemployed,
and thousands had regrouped for the purpose of illegal diamond or gold
mining, or on rubber plantations."), available at http://www.childsoldiers
globalreport.org/content/liberia. See generally Michael L. Ross, Oil, Drugs
and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War, in THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOv OF ARMED CONFUCT: BEYOND GREED AND GRIEVANCE 47
(Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman eds., 2003) (illustrating how plentiful
natural resources can ignite civil war).
46. United States Department of Labor, 2008 Findings on the Worst Forms
of Child Labour - Colombia, UNHCR REFwoRLD (Sept 10, 2009), http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOL,,COL,,4aba3ee88,0.html.
47. Scorr GATES & SIMON REICH, Introduction, in CHILD SOLDIERS IN THE
AGE OF FRACTURED STATES 3, 6 (Scott Gaines & Simon Reich eds., 2009)
("Criminal leaders often play a significant role in the dynamics of armed
conflict, motivated by the drug trade or the control of natural resources.
They have comparably easy access to arms. As a result, it is often functionally
difficult to distinguish urban youth gangs from armed groups that recruit
children."); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "My GUN WAS AS TALL AS ME": CHILD
SOLDIERS IN BURMA 155 (2002) (discussing the Mong Tai army's emergence
from a local drug trafficking militia to an army engaged in the drug trade
and heavily recruiting child soldiers). See Confronting Drug Trafficking in West
Africa: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on African Affairs of the S. Comm on Foreign
Relations, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow,
International Strategy and Assessment Center); see generally Paul Rexton Kan,
Drug Intoxicated Irregular Fighters: Complications, Dangers, and Responses, STRA-
TEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (Mar. 2008).
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of such regulations, as well as the sanctions available under the
international system. Despite criticisms on its implementation,
the more developed international regulatory framework and
institutional coordination fostered under the 1988 U.N. Con-
vention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, 4 8 coupled with states' own enforcement of
their respective domestic laws on prohibited substances, makes
it more costly for armed groups to sustainably finance their
conflict operations from cross-border trafficking of prohibited
substances. It would be easier for states to collaterally enforce
international prohibitions on child soldiering in relation to
contraband or prohibited substances, since these goods are al-
ready banned per se at the state's territorial borders. Without
having to verify that child soldiers were used to produce or
distribute contraband goods or prohibited substances, states
already exercise their respective customs jurisdiction to ban
these prohibited or contraband goods from entering their bor-
ders.
Moreover, when armed groups use child soldiers to facili-
tate cross-border drug trafficking, the established system of in-
ternational regulatory cooperation and coordination among
states also enables early detection of child soldiers at the bor-
der. At that threshold of early detection, states can already
devise and implement measures to ensure child soldiers' de-
mobilization and safe reintegration into their home communi-
ties, among other duties incumbent upon them under the Op-
tional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child
on the involvement of children in armed conflict. While child
soldier detection at territorial borders raises its own corre-
sponding set of immigration issues for states,49 in these situa-
tions states at least possess clearer factual bases before them to
implement the international prohibitions against child soldier-
ing.
International regulation appears more elusive when
armed groups use child soldiers for the production and distri-
48. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 19, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter
1988 U.N. Drug Convention].
49. See generally Jennifer C. Everett, The Battle Continues: Fighting for a More
Child-Sensitive Approach to Asylum for Child Soldiers, 21 FLA.J. INT'L L. 285, 313-
344 (2009).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
350 [Vol. 43:337
LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS
bution of facially licit goods such as diamonds, oil, and other
natural resources.50 Private buyers of diamonds, oil, and other
resources cannot be expected to investigate and determine for
themselves if such goods originated from armed groups, or
more so, if such goods had been produced and distributed us-
ing child soldiers. For an international ban to be effective at
targeting these particular sources of financing of armed
groups, states must be able to ensure that banned facially licit
goods are imputable to, or identifiable with, an armed group
that uses child soldiers in the production or distribution of
such goods. However, at present, there is no international sys-
tem or set of protocols for distinguishing goods produced or
distributed by child soldiers from legitimate trade in goods.
In light of the contested dynamics of current interna-
tional legal regulation on the trading activities of armed
groups, I propose in Part III that states could also act in their
own capacities, under the authority of the exceptions provi-
sions in GATT Articles XX (General Exceptions) and XXI (Se-
curity Exceptions), to ban or restrict trade in goods attributa-
ble to armed groups that use the labor of child soldiers, with-
out violating WTO principles and the GATT norms on non-
discrimination, most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment, na-
tional treatment, and the prohibition against quantitative re-
strictions. These GATT exceptions enable WTO member
states to vindicate core societal values and interests"1 through
trade-restrictive measures that would otherwise violate multi-
lateral trading rules that require such states to treat goods of
"other countries at least as well as it treats the "most favoured"
country" (non-discrimination and MFN principles in GATT
Article I),52 and prohibit internal "discrimination against for-
eign products" (national treatment principle in GATT Article
III).53 By creating economic disincentives for armed groups
that enlist child soldiers, I contend that trade restrictions on
50. See Asif Efrat, A Theory of Internationally Regulated Goods, 32 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 1466, 1466-67 (2009) (observing that, despite a general trend to-
wards increasing regulated trade, illicit goods are generally left out of regula-
tory schemes).
51. See SIMON LESTER, ET AL., WoRLD TRADE LAw: TEXT, MATERIALS AND
COMMENTARY 381 (2008) (listing the public policy goals that governments
may vindicate via Article XX).
52. Id at 322.
53. Id. at 278.
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goods produced through the labor of child soldiers apply the
international duties of states under the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement
of children in armed conflict, to "take all feasible measures to
prevent [their] recruitment and use,"54 and to "take all neces-
sary measures to ensure the effective implementation and en-
forcement of the provisions" of ILO Convention No. 182.55 I
argue that states could be justified in banning or otherwise re-
stricting trade in goods produced or distributed by child
soldiers on the ground that they are taking measures "neces-
sary to protect public morals,"56 "necessary to secure compli-
ance with laws or regulations" 5 7 or "necessary for the protec-
tion of its essential security interests relating to the traffic in
arms, ammunitions, and implements of war and to such traffic
in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for
the purpose of supplying a military establishment."5 8 I argue that
this proposal does not contradict the nascent trend of W'TO
Appellate Body jurisprudence, which interprets General Ex-
ceptions (GATT Article XX) and Security Exceptions (Article
XXI) provisions according to multi-tiered tests that correlate
the general chapeau of the provision, the necessary measure,
and the objective purposes of these exceptions provisions. Fi-
nally, I submit that state-imposed bans have advantages over
"soft" certification measures such as the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds (KPCS) because
they can be checked and duly challenged within the frame-
work of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism.
Part IV closes the analysis with a brief review of current
international methods to stop child soldiering, which focus on
a common objective of monitoring and punishing armed
groups for the direct participation of children in hostilities. I
situate my proposal within the assumption that armed groups
recruit children for their ability to assume diverse roles in
armed conflicts. Terminating the financing sources of armed
groups from trade in child soldier-produced goods is one pos-
sible way to further disincentivize the recruitment of children
54. Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, supra note 19, art. 4.2.
55. ILO Convention No. 182, supra note 29, art. 7(1).
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. XX(a), Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
57. Id. at XX(d).
58. Id. at XXI(b) (ii) (emphasis added).
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in war. In protracted armed conflicts sustained by an armed
group's economic dependence on trade in facially licit goods
produced or distributed through armed groups' use of child
soldiers, state-imposed bans are necessary components to a
comprehensive global strategy against child soldiering. These
unilateral measures do not breach treaty obligations in the
GATT, and absent breach or non-conformity with these pri-
mary obligations, states cannot be held internationally respon-
sible under the general law of state responsibility. By imposing
these bans, states could also argue that they act to fulfill their
explicit international responsibilities, under the relevant inter-
national conventions and Security Council resolutions, to pre-
vent and dismantle situations of impunity that make it condu-
cive, in the first place, to enlist and subjugate children to mili-
tary duties and economic labors that perpetuate armed
conflicts. Finally, Part IV offers future research directions
from interdisciplinary research and empirical analysis, includ-
ing a brief analysis of a 2009 legislative proposal from the
United States, H.R. 4128 (otherwise known as the Conflict
Minerals Trade Act), as a possible model in designing policies
to ban or restrict the flow of child soldier-produced or -distrib-
uted goods.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY ASYMMETRY.
DIFFICULTIES IN MONITORING AND TRACKING ARMED GROUPS'
TRADE IN FACIALLY LICIT GOODS AS OPPOSED TO TRADE IN
PROHIBITED SUBSTANCES
Since the end of the Cold War, armed groups and govern-
ment forces alike more frequently rely on revenues from trade
in goods to finance their operations in armed conflicts. A sur-
vey of armed conflicts from 1994-2001 observes that "[t]ihe re-
sources most frequently linked to civil conflict are diamonds
and other gemstones (seven conflicts, all of them civil wars);
oil and natural gas (seven conflicts, six of them civil wars); il-
licit drugs (five conflicts, all of them civil wars); and timber
(three conflicts, all of them civil wars). Legal agricultural
crops played a role in two conflicts (both civil wars), although
in each case other natural resources played larger roles."59
Steady decreases in post-Cold War foreign assistance to gov-
59. Ross, supra note 45, at 48.
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ernments and armed groups have impelled them to seek pri-
vate sources of funding to finance their military activities.
Armed groups today draw funding from multiple revenue
sources, such as lucrative trade in natural resources like tim-
ber, oil, and other facially licit goods; proceeds from criminal
activities; and diversion of relief aid. Trade in "conflict
goods," as described by one author, persists from a combina-
tion of strategies, such as: armed groups' taxation of resources
or commercial sectors; extraction of payment for the protec-
tion of resources; outright sale of resources or goods, as had
occurred in Angola (oil), Afghanistan (heroin), Liberia (tim-
ber, diamonds, and rubber), and Sierra Leone (passports sold
to facilitate outsiders' arms trade); the importation of non-mil-
itary resources; the provision of trading concessions to private
parties in return for direct military support; and "diaspora"
trade, or trade of conflict goods (both facially licit and prohib-
ited goods) facilitated by middlemen for resale in third coun-
tries.60 Unsurprisingly, the strategic value of natural resource
assets, as both tools and objectives to maintain the power dy-
namics in favor of armed groups, has led to a "growing con-
cern that whereas resources were once a means of funding and
waging armed conflict for states to a political end, armed con-
flict is increasingly becoming the means to individual commer-
cial ends: gaining access to valuable resources."6'
While the U.N. Security Council has used its sanctioning
power over the past two decades to effectuate embargoes in
armed conflicts, sanctions have not always been timely, nor
have they been specifically targeted against the trading capac-
ity of armed groups for facially licit goods. Commodity sanc-
tions, for example, have been sparingly imposed, and usually
only in tandem with other peacekeeping measures, as was
done in Cambodia, 62 Angola,63 Sierra Leone, 64 Afghanistan,65
60. Neil Cooper, Conflict Goods: The Challenges for Peacekeeping and Conflict
Prevention, 8 INr'L PEACEKEEPING 21, 24-26 (2001). Significantly, Cooper ar-
gues that "strategies to restrict the flow of conflict goods may actually be
more effective in promoting peace than initiatives aimed at restricting arms
proliferation." Id. at 21-22.
61. Philippe le Billon, The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and
Armed Conflicts, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 561, 562 (2001).
62. See S.C. Res. 792, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/792 (Nov. 30, 1992) (threat-
ening future petroleum sanctions).
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Liberia,6 6 and C6te d'Ivoire. 6 7 In 2007, the U.N. Secretary-
General recommended to the U.N. Security Council that it
consider imposing targeted measures against parties to armed
conflicts who continue to systematically commit grave viola-
tions against children, including "a ban on the export or sup-
ply of arms, a ban on military assistance, the imposition of
travel restrictions on leaders, their exclusion from any govern-
ance structures and amnesty provisions, and restriction of theflow
of financial resources to the parties concerned." 6 8
What is most disturbing in the changed complexion of fi-
nancing for armed conflicts is the increasing long-term con-
vertibility of child soldiers, from being direct participants in
hostilities to abused laborers in armed groups' diverse eco-
nomic activities. It is not unheard of for a child to participate
in direct combat during an internecine conflict, and to revert
to resource extraction, mining, and trafficking activities for
the armed group during temporary ceasefires. In Myanmar,
children as young as nine years old are enlisted:
[i]n some cases, children were taken from their par-
ents under the guise of wanting to give them educa-
tional opportunities, but they were in fact placed in
military schools and expected to join the army. Chil-
dren are given the same basic training as other
soldiers, but if they are not strong enough to carry
their own guns or backpacks they can be kept in bat-
talion camps for months or years. If they are too
young to be sent out on operations (ie under the age
of 12 or 13), they can be used as forced labor on
63. See S.C. Res. 1173, 12(a)-(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (June 12,
1998) (employing sanctions on diamonds, mining, motorized vehicles, and
vehicle parts).
64. See S.C. Res. 1306, passim, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1306 (July 5, 2000) (im-
posing sanctions on diamonds).
65. See S.C. Res. 1333, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (re-
stricting the sale of arms, materiel, and technical advice).
66. S.C. Res. 1343, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1343 (Mar. 7, 2001) (demand-
ing that all states prevent the import of rough diamonds).
67. S.C. Res. 1643, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1643 (Dec. 15, 2005) (demand-
ing that all states prevent the import of rough diamonds).
68. U.N. Secretary General, Children and Armed Conflict: Rep. of the Secre-
tary-General, 1 163, U.N. Doc. A/62/609-S/2007/757 (Dec. 21, 2007) (em-
phasis added).
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projects such as digging roads, taking care of animals
or cutting grass and bushes.69
The interchangeability of children's roles is also exacer-
bated when conflicts metamorphose into situations of instabil-
ity for an indeterminate duration, often involving "cross-bor-
der operations of armed opposition groups, the international
and local arms trade, and the sale of natural resources, narcot-
ics, and other commodities used to sponsor conflict. "Around
centres of conflict, there are often extended zones of
'bounded instability' which experience sporadic violence.
Long-term situations of 'neither peace nor war' can therefore
ensue."70 Where the prolonged conduct of war blurs the lines
between direct hostilities and support or financing activities,
armed groups easily utilize child soldiers for one form of labor
or another, depending on operational expedience and mili-
tary necessity.
For these reasons, the U.N. Secretary-General's Special
Representative for Children and Armed Conflict reports that
child soldiers are especially vulnerable in contemporary asset
or resource wars, where their roles have indefinitely expanded
beyond direct participation in hostilities to forced labor.
The illicit exploitation of natural resources in zones
of conflict, has a direct and significant bearing on
children. They are exploited as cheap labor and
forced to work in unhealthy and dangerous condi-
tions with devastating consequences for their future.
This practice of plunder is robbing children of their
birthright to education, healthcare and development.
Moreover, this has become a principal means of fuel-
ling and prolonging conflicts in which children suffer
the most. Closely related to the grey area in which
69. Submission by the Burma U.N. Service Office-New York and the
Human Rights Documentation Unit to the Office to the Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict
for the preparation of the Secretary-General's third report to the Security
Council on children and armed conflict, on the implementation of resolu-
tions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), and 1379 (2001), The Impact ofArmed Conflict
on the Children of Burma, at 24 (Aug. 2002).
70. United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental and Socioeco-
nomic Impacts ofArmed Conflict in Africa, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EARTH, http://
www.eoearth.org/article/Environmental-and-socioeconomicimpacts_of
armedconflictinAfrica?topic=49473 (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
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criminality and politically motivated action intersect
is the phenomenon of asset or resource wars, where
conflict often revolves around the control of territory
or the State apparatus as a direct means of command-
ing natural resources such as oil, diamonds, gold,
coltan, timber or cocoa. Empirical evidence indicates
that in these asset wars there are often a multiplicity
of actors vying for a stake, from government-armed
forces and armed groups opposed to the State, to in-
ternational interests such as other States, multina-
tional corporations and criminal cartels. There is
often also close interlinkage with other lucrative and
mainly illicit trade such as in weapons and drugs,
which serves to fuel and prolong conflict. Beyond
conscription as soldiers and other categories of grave
violations, children may also be forced to labor in
mining activities or be exposed to criminal networks
engaged in child trafficking.71
The further use of child soldiers for economic activities
supporting armed groups has been reported in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America:
In many regions, armed conflicts are financed
through the illicit exploitation and trade in natural
resources and precious minerals like diamonds, gold
and timber, but also in narcotics. Child soldiers have
been used to protect the mining and other extractive
operations, since the parties to the conflict rely on
the exploitation and marketing of the resources,
sometimes with the cooperation of the private sector
and neighbouring countries. In sub-Saharan Africa,
the illicit trade in diamonds has financed civil wars in
Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Colombia, My-
anmar and Afghanistan drugs are traded by many
parties in the armed conflicts. In the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo, parties to armed conflict exploit
gold, diamonds, timber and coltan-an important re-
source in high-technology industries-and export
71. U.N. Office of the Special Representative of the Sec'y-Gen. on Chil-
dren and Armed Conflict, Impact on Children of Illicit Exploitation of Natural
Resources in Conflict Zones, U.N., http://www.un.org/children/conflict/en-
glish/exploitation.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
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those resources illegally across the country's bor-
ders.72
As will be shown in the subsections below, there is a clear
disparity in the nature of international regulation affecting
armed groups' trade in contraband and prohibited substances,
and their trade in facially licit goods and commodities. While
the former is covered by a rigorous international cooperative
network policing the trade of such goods, states have not yet
reached internationally binding measures on facially licit
goods and commodities. (As will be shown later, the KPCS is
not an internationally obligatory system.) Instead, states ap-
pear to await U.N. Security Council action imposing trade em-
bargoes on facially licit goods and commodities in relation to
armed conflicts, before implementing any such bans or quanti-
tative restrictions in their territories.73
72. Lilian Peters, War is No Child's Play: Child Soldiers from Battlefield to Play-
ground 10-11 (Geneva Ctr. for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Oc-
casiolnal Paper No. 8, 2005). The DRC also holds the world's largest
reserves of tantalum. Dena Montague, Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 22 S.A.I.S. REV. 103, 105 (2002). Montague
also explains that "coltan is but one of many resources illegally mined and
sold into western markets to profit invading armies and rebel forces. Trade
in diamonds, timber, copper, gold and cobalt also helped finance invading
armies and rebel movements. Coltan happened to be the most lucrative raw
material, and, more than any other mineral resource, it attracted the invad-
ing forces and lured them into establishing full-fledged commercial opera-
tions." Id. at 104-)5.
73. Historically, states directly intervened to monitor and restrict the dia-
mond trade only after the U.N. Security Council issued commodity sanctions
specific to the diamond trade. See DAVID CORTRIGHT ET AL., SANcrIONS AND
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY 181-200 (2002). For a recent discussion of the
"new" jurisdiction of the U.N. Security Council in economic issues, such as
illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources and conflict goods by
armed groups, see Kristin E. Boon, Coining a New Jurisdiction: The U.N. Secur-
ity Council as Economic Peacekeeper, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 991, 1007-08
(2008). But seeJAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBAUZATION 242 (2004)
(arguing that unilateral embargoes are less efficacious than multilateral em-
bargoes, and may simply serve to frustrate business groups at the expense of
human rights goals).
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A. Comprehensive International Regulations on Armed Groups'
Trade in Prohibited Substances
Armed conflicts create numerous opportunities and in-
centives for armed groups to trade in contraband goods and
prohibited substances, so much so that:
whatever posture they assume-either as guerrillas
turning into criminals or as members of mafias with
an alliance of crime and revolution-[they create]
mutual resources of monies and weapons to the war
machines of terror, counterterror, revolution, and
counterrevolution. The links between crime and ter-
rorist insurrections masquerading as revolutions ap-
pear to be growing stronger and also perpetrate con-
flicts that encourage terrorism and make peace more
elusive.7 4
Illicit trade, however, can be undertaken both by states and by
rebel groups within a state:
[i]n one case (Peru), only the rebels systematically
raised money from the drug trade. In the other
cases, both sides earned money from drugs-in two
cases (Afghanistan and Burma) because the govern-
ment was willing to endure international sanctions,
and in the third case (Colombia) because drug reve-
nues were collected by paramilitary forces, which
were allied with the government but sufficiently inde-
pendent from it (at least nominally) to allow the gov-
ernment to avoid international sanctions.75
Child soldiers are especially useful to armed groups en-
gaged in the drug trade, since drugs, like diamonds, gold, and
other gemstones, are "easily extracted and transported by indi-
viduals or small teams of unskilled workers."76
Three international treaties comprehensively promote in-
ternational cooperation to police and criminalize trafficking
in illegal drugs and other prohibited substances: (1) the 1988
74. ROBERTJ. KELLY, ET AL., ILLICIT TRAFFICKING: A REFERENCE -IANDBOOK
14 (2005).
75. Ross, supra note 45, at 63.
76. Alexandra Guiqueta, The Colombian Conflict: Political and Economic
Dimensions, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARMED CONFLICT: BEYOND GREED
AND GRIEVANCE 73 (Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman eds., 2003).
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U.N. Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, with about 170 states parties;77 (2)
the 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, with
about 180 states parties;78 and (3) the 1971 U.N. Convention
on Psychotropic Substances, with 183 states parties.79 Under
these conventions, states harmonize rules criminalizing the
use, possession, sale, production, manufacture, and trafficking
of various types of illegal drugs, under combined international
schedules of prohibited substances and quantities of such sub-
stances.8 Among these conventions, the 1988 Convention
specifically qualifies the gravity of offenses in relation to traf-
ficking of illegal drugs as "particularly serious" when they in-
volve the "victimization or use of minors."81 All three conven-
tions establish interrelated rules on subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction;8 2 standardized procedures for determining
the estimation, cultivation, and confiscation of prohibited sub-
stances;83 legal and administrative cooperation among states in
actions against the illicit traffic of such substances; 84 Customs,
77. 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 48.
78. United Nations Convention Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
Mar. 30, 1961, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter 1961 U.N. Drug Convention].
79. United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Feb. 21,
1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter 1971 U.N. Drug Convention].
80. See Int'l Narcotics Control Board [INCB], List of Precursors and Chemi-
cal Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances under International Control (11th ed. Jan. 2007) (prepared in accor-
dance with the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention); INCB, List of Narcotic Drugs
Under International Control (48th ed. Dec. 2008) (prepared in accordance
with the 1961 U.N. Drug Convention); INCB, List of Psychotrapic Substances
under International Control (23d ed. Aug. 2003) (prepared in accordance with
the 1971 U.N. Drug Convention).
81. 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 48, art. 3.5(f).
82. See id. art. 4; 1971 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 79, arts. 2-7;
1961 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 78, art. 4.
83. See 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 48, art. 5 (setting forth
protocol regarding confiscation of drugs); 1961 U.N. Drug Convention,
supra note 78, arts. 19-21 (setting forth protocol regarding estimation of
drug requirements by states), 22-24 (setting forth protocol regarding cultiva-
tion), 36-37 (confiscation).
84. 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 48, arts. 6-10 (setting forth
obligations regarding extradition and various avenues of mutual legal assis-
tance); 1971 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 79, art. 21 (requiring the
parties to puruse a coordinated campaign against illegal drugs); 1961 U.N.
Drug Convention, supra note 78, arts. 4, 35 (requiring the parties to coordi-
nate in order to combat illegal traffic in narcotic drugs).
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trade, and commercial regulation, including permitted quanti-
ties of such substances for medical or scientific purposes;85
and the settlement of disputes.86
Most importantly, all three conventions operate under
common centralized international authorities and institutions,
such as the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board. While these international
conventions have not completely eradicated drug trafficking,
they have contributed significantly to international efforts to
dismantle drug trafficking groups and curb the illegal drug
trade. Until the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, anti-drug-traf-
ficking measures were largely dependent on national initia-
tives. International cooperation under the 1988 U.N. Drug
Convention developed mutual legal assistance in investiga-
tions, prosecutions, confiscations, extradition, controlled de-
liveries and money laundering into a coherent international
regime.87
Under the established system of international coopera-
tion, information-sharing, and regulatory protocols against il-
legal trafficking, states have the means not just to apprehend
the illicit entry of prohibited substances within their borders,
but also to investigate and determine the origin of such sub-
stances. Transnational investigations have led to the detection
of child soldier involvement and participation in the produc-
tion, use, or trafficking of prohibited substances, as in Brazil,88
85. See 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 48, arts. 15-18 (articulat-
ing measures in the realm of commercial trade to suppress the illegal drug
trade) 1971 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 79, arts. 12-15 (international
trade and shipping); 1961 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 78, arts. 29-32
(manufacturing and international trade).
86. 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 48, art. 32; 1971 U.N. Drug
Convention, supra note 79, art. 31; 1961 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note
78, art. 48.
87. Sandeep Chawla & Thomas Pietschmann, Drug Trafficking as a Trans-
national Crime, in HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIME & JUSTICE 160, 177-
180 (Philip Reichel ed., 2005); cf Stephen David Brown, Controlled Deliveries,
in COMBATING INTERNATIONAL CRIME: THE LONGER ARM OF THE LAw 199,
199-204 (Stephen David Brown ed., 2008) (discussing controlled deliveries
as a technique to combat international drug trafficking).
88. Jens Gl(fsing, Violence in Rio dejaneiro: Child Soldiers in the Drug Wars,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
spiegel/0,1518,469510,00.html.
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Colombia,89 Myanmar,90 and Africa.91 In the past decade, this
interlinkage between child soldiering and illegal drug traffick-
ing has become much clearer in internal armed conflicts, civil
disturbances and urban unrest, and transnational criminal ac-
tivities.92 As one author contends:
[a]s most of these governments, movements, or
armed groups do not have access to the free global
economy the situation is only exacerbated by the fact
that these actors must often fund their war efforts
through illegal channels. Rebel groups and non-state
actors may resort to plundering and blackmailing ci-
vilian populations for sources of finance. . . . The
children abducted or enrolled in armed groups are,
in numerous cases, held under influence by alcohol,
drugs, or other substances ... We will therefore ar-
gue that the fight against child soldiers necessitates
increased cooperation and collaboration in the fight
against drugs and crime: from narcotics to corrup-
tion, illegal traffics, and small arms smuggling.93
The 1988 U.N. Drug Convention recognizes the practical
utility of children to illegal drug trafficking, and as such, en-
ables states' domestic courts to consider the "involvement of
the offender in other international organized criminal activi-
ties,"94 "involvement of the offender in other illegal activities
facilitated by the commission of the offence,"95 as well as the
"victimization or use of children," as qualifying circumstances
to merit more severe punishment against drug traffickers.96
89. 2008 CSG Report, supra note 31, at 99.
90. Child soldiers and opium cultivation, two faces of Burma's dark pit, ASIA
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2009), http://www.asianews.it/index.php?art=17124&l=en&
size=A.
91. AFRICA: Too Small to be Fighting in Anyone's War, IRINNEWS.ORG (Dec.
2003), http://www.irinnews.org/IndepthMain.aspx?Indepthld=24&Report
Id=66280.
92. John P. Sullivan, Child Soldiers: Despair, Barbarization, and Conflict, AIR
& SPACE POWER J., Mar. 2008, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.
mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2008/1triO8/sullivaneng.htm.
93. Alexandre J. Vautravers, Why Child Soldiers are Such a Complex Issue, 27
REFUGEE Q. SURv. 4, 106 (2009).
94. 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, supra note 48, art. 3(5) (b).
95. Id. art. 3(5) (c).
96. Id. art. 3(5) (f).
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B. Minimal International Regulation on Armed Groups' Trade in
Facially Licit Goods
Child soldiers are also invaluable to sustaining armed
groups' trade in facially licit goods such as diamonds, gold, oil,
timber, and other natural resources, and legal agricultural
crops. In the Philippines, a democracy still besieged by some
of the longest-running insurgencies in Southeast Asia,
paramilitary units and separatist groups give children eco-
nomic tasks around the camp, a form of enlistment where the
children could later become combatants. 97 The use of chil-
dren in economic activities of armed groups appears more
starkly in the DRC, where children have been used repeatedly
for mining and quarrying activities that help finance the mili-
tary operations of armed groups.98 These cases demonstrate
the distinct utility children bring to armed groups in a wide
spectrum of operations involved in conducting a protracted
armed conflict. Apart from serving to augment combat units'
manpower in the field, children also comprise the backbone
of armed groups' mining and quarrying workforces, particu-
larly sought for their small size, dexterity, trainability, cheap
food intake, and large supply in impoverished civilian popula-
tions. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) attrib-
utes this phenomenon to the fact that armed conflicts cause
rampant disruptions to regular economic activities, leading
families and children to seek or accept work in mines and
quarries:
[. ..C]hild labour in mining is one of those forms of
work which is particularly closely associated with eco-
nomic and social disruption. Even if virtually disap-
97. See Philippines: Child soldiers in the spotlight as Mindanao battle rages,
IRINNEWS.ORG (Oct. 21, 2008), http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Re-
portId=81015 (explaining that children have chores around the camp, and
that some eventually fight).
98. See GLOBAL WITNESS, FACED WITH A GUN, WHAT CAN You Do? WAR
AND THE MILITARISATION OF MINING IN EASTERN CONGO 24 ("[T]ens of
thousands of people, including children, work as artisanal miners" in East-
ern Congo) (2009) [hereinafter 2009 GLOBAL WITrNEss REPORT]; see also U.N.
Secretary-General Panel of Experts, U.N. Report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, 1 69, 109-212 (Apr. 12, 2001) (reporting on the use of
child labour in mining activities, and analysing how resource exploitation
helps to finance the war).
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pearing for a time, it tends to reassert itself when civil
wars break out and cut off normal commerce, when
drought destroys livelihoods or whenever else times
get tough. It usually occurs far from sight: up in the
mountains or out in the border areas. And it relo-
cates swiftly, responding to hints and whispers of a
gold strike here orjobs there ... Far from the public
eye, children in small-scale mining are vulnerable to
a panoply of social, psychological, and physical dan-
gers not found in many other forms of work.99
Noting this reality, ILO Convention No. 138 (the Mini-
mum Age Convention) permits states parties to exclude spe-
cific categories of work or economic activity from the mini-
mum age requirement of eighteen years, but specifically bars
such states from excluding mining and quarrying, which by na-
ture jeopardize the health and safety of children.100
To date, KPCS is the only known attempt to enforce quan-
titative restrictions or bans to curb the financing of armed con-
flicts. The KPCS is a non-binding "soft law" instrument ban-
ning the export and import of rough diamonds to and from
non-participants in the certification scheme. Participating
governments in the KPCS certify that rough diamond ship-
ments are free of "conflict diamonds," defined by the U.N.
General Assembly as rough diamonds "used by rebel move-
ments to finance their military activities, including the at-
tempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate govern-
ments." 01 Participating countries in KPCS can only trade
rough diamonds with fellow participants. They must also pass
legislation that devises control systems for the export and im-
port of rough diamonds. As observed by the United States
Government Accountability Office, "[t]o succeed, KPCS de-
pends on all participants having strong control systems and
procedures for collecting and sharing trade data on rough
99. Int'l Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, Mining and
Quanying, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ipec/areas/Miningandquarrying/lang
-en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
100. ILO, Minimum Age Convention, June 26, 1973, arts. 3(1), 5(3), ILO
Convention No. 138, June 26, 1973; see also GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ON RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 267 (1998) (discussing specific
economic activates that may not be excluded from the Minimum Age Con-
vention).
101. G.A. Res. 55/56, pmbl. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001).
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diamonds, for inspecting imports and exports of these
diamonds, and for tracking confirmations of import and ex-
port receipts."102
On its face, the KPCS appears to contravene core norms
of the GATT, such as prohibitions against quantitative restric-
tions, the principle of non-discrimination, the most-favoured
nation clause, and the principle of national treatment. Pursu-
ant to its authority under article IX(3) of the WTO Agree-
ment, and taking into consideration U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 55/56, which specifically called on the interna-
tional community to create a "simple and workable interna-
tional certification scheme for rough diamonds,"103 the WTO
General Council issued a waiver in May 2003 to suspend the
operation of such GATT prohibitions for WTO Member States
that participate in the KPCS.104 Notwithstanding international
cooperation at this level, however, the inherently non-binding
nature of the KPCS, along with its lack of systematic monitor-
ing and enforcement, lends weight to the criticism that it has
not succeeded in eliminating the flow of conflict diamonds,
particularly in the Republic of Congo.10 5
Against its unique genesis and still-unproven record in
segregating conflict diamonds from legitimate diamond trade,
it is difficult to replicate the KPCS as a general paradigm for
enforcing international prohibitions against child soldiering.
For one, the KPCS creates a certification system specific to the
102. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-978, CONFLICT
DIAMONDs: AGENCY ACTIONs NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CLAN DIAMOND TRADE Act 38 (2005).
103. G.A. Res. 55/56, supra note 101, 1 3(a).
104. Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for
Political Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L.
615, 624 (2009); Karen E. Woody, Diamonds on the Souls of Her Shoes: The
Kimberley Process and the Morality Exception to WTO Restrictions, 22 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 335, 348 (2007).
105. See Seth A. Malamut, A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the
Kimberley Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 25, 41-55 (2005) (documenting the
ways in which diamond exporters have worked around the KPCS); Haley
Blaire Goldman, Between a ROC and a Hard Place: The Republic of Congo's Illicit
Trade in Diamonds and Efforts to Break the Cycle of Corruption, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L
L. 359, 374-77 (2008) (citing reports that demonstrate a discrepancy from
the Republic of Congo between massive export of rough diamonds and the
lack of reported production or importation of rough diamonds).
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diamond trade, while armed groups' trade in facially licit
goods produced with the labor of child soldiers are not limited
to diamond resources. Second, a voluntary certification sys-
tem such as the KPCS does not authoritatively determine the
provenance of a good. Where the origin of state-certified
rough diamonds is disputed, the KPCS does not contain any
definitive procedure for resolving the controversy. As a self-
regulatory system dependent on the voluntary participation of
diamond-trading states, enforcement of quantitative restric-
tions or outright bans cannot be compelled. Finally and most
importantly, it would have to take another article IX(3) waiver
decision from the WTO General Council to authorize any such
certification system for facially licit goods produced and dis-
tributed through the labor of child soldiers. There is no assur-
ance that a new waiver decision of this nature could be ob-
tained under the same substantial international political con-
sensus as the Kimberley Process. Mobilizing an influential
majority within the WTO system in support of such a waiver
would require more states to expend political resources and
allocate favours that they may need for their respective ongo-
ing trade negotiations. 06
Outside of the soft law initiatives under the KPCS for con-
flict diamonds, and the select U.N.-imposed trade embargoes
previously discussed,107 there is no international regulation di-
rectly applicable to armed groups' trade in facially licit goods
such as minerals and commodities. Even the KPCS-which
came into effect in January 2003 under a popular climate of
international and cross-sectional support from key players of
the diamond industry, states, NGOs, and the U.N. Security
Council's endorsement under resolution 55/56-suffers sev-
eral fatal design problems. First, while the certification system
depends greatly on the reliability of information brought in by
participating states in KPCS, there is still no "comprehensive
system for the gathering and analysis of diamond production
and trading statistics. . .. Without a comprehensive database
on the production and trade of rough diamonds, the KPCS
will be unable to identify anomalies or do even the most rudi-
106. On the structural problems of decision-making rules in the WTO, see
generally Debra P. Steger, The Future of the WTO: The Case for Institutional
Reform, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 803, 808-14 (2009).
107. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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mentary tracking of diamond flows." 108 Second, states partici-
pating in the KPCS did not reach any consensus whatsoever on
the international monitoring process to ascertain states' com-
pliance with their unilateral promises under the system.
Third, it was not until April 2003 that the KPCS launched
membership procedures that tied continuing membership in
the system with states' enactment of KPCS-related domestic
legislation. In practice, KPCS does not have any functional
sanctions that could be imposed against such states other than
exclusion from KPCS membership. Exclusion, however, would
only be counter-productive to the objectives of the KPCS, since
it would foreclose any possibility of cooperation on stopping
the illicit diamond trade, as KPCS realized in the case of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which it expelled in 2004
and readmitted in 2007. By failing to reach any binding agree-
ment among states on these issues and subjecting the entire
process of compliance to cyclical negotiations among KPCS
participants, there is little prospect of imposing an "enforce-
ment net" on armed groups' trade in diamonds that comes
anywhere near the web of international regulation and en-
forcement cooperation in drug trafficking.
While the KPCS imperfectly targets the "blood diamond"
trade, there are virtually no other similar international mecha-
nisms in place for armed groups' trade in other facially licit
minerals and commodities. One author implicitly acknowl-
edges this dearth of international regulation in his proposal
for states to conclude international agreements to curb trade
in conflict goods:
... trade in conflict goods depends on companies op-
erating in legitimate markets (e.g. diamonds, timber,
etc.). Such companies have to work within the frame-
work of domestic and international law. ... [B] oth
international agreements and/or pressure from civil
society have the potential to influence the willingness
of such actors to support the trade in conflict
goods.109
108. Ian Smillie, What Lessons from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?,
in PROFITING FROM PEACE: MANAGING THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL
WAR 47, 60 (Karen Ballentine & Heiko Nitzschke eds., 2005).
109. Cooper, supra note 60, at 28.
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As a result of the regulatory gap, foreign companies can
continue to purchase minerals and commodities, having to
comply only with the local customs regulations of states where
such minerals and commodities are sold, as well as the more
general contract obligations between buyers and sellers under
the Convention on the International Sale of Goods.110 This
burdens individual states to themselves police, monitor, and
prevent the entry and exit of armed groups' trade in facially
licit goods in their respective territories.
Absent a common set of international rules analogous to
the international framework on prohibited substances, and
without specifically applicable domestic regulations against
child soldier-produced, -distributed, -assembled and/or -man-
ufactured goods, state practice to date has been uneven on the
enforcement of child soldier prohibitions in relation to trade.
In the DRC, multinational companies from Europe, Asia, and
elsewhere have reportedly been "buying minerals from
comptoirs known to be trading with armed groups for several
years, apparently without adjusting their practices in light of
the conflict or carrying out sufficient due diligence to ensure
that their trade is not fuelling the violence.""1 ' Some of the
companies identified as having participated in the minerals
trade from conflict zones include Belgian companies
Trademet, Traxys, SDE, STI and Specialty Metals; Thailand
Smelting and Refining Corporation (the world's fifth-largest
tin producing company) owned by a British metals company,
Amalgamated Metal Corporation (AMC) Group; MPC, a
Rwanda-based subsidiary of South African-owned Kivu Re-
sources; African Ventures Ltd in China; Met Trade India Ltd
in India; Eurosib Logistics JSC in Russia; BEB Investment Inc.
in Canada; Novosibirsk Integrated Tin Works in Russia; and
the Blattner Elwyn Group in the United States.1 12 The DRC is
a particularly significant mining resource for tantalum and cas-
siterite, which is indispensable for making the miniature high-
voltage capacity for circuits in high-end technology goods such
as mobile phones, PDAs, laptops, video game consoles, among
110. See U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988)
(making no exceptions for trade of minerals or commodities) [hereinafter
1980 U.N. Convention for the Sale of Goods].
111. 2009 GLOBAL WITNEss REPORT, supra note 98, at 59.
112. Id. at 59-69.
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others. The highest numbers of child soldiers have been used
in the DRC, where they are interchangeably used for mining
operations apart from participation in hostilities, numbering
"up to 40% of rebel and government forces at the war's height,
with more than 10,000 yet to be demobilized."" 3
Notably, there appears to be growing international recog-
nition of the need for state action on armed groups' trade in
facially licit goods. The 2008 Final Report of the U.N.'s Group
of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo revealed that
"a number of mineral-exporting companies, transport compa-
nies and fuel businesses could be acting as fronts for the Con-
gres national pour la defense du people."114 In the same Report,
the Group of Experts found evidence that "Rwandan authori-
ties have been complicit in the recruitment of soldiers, includ-
ing children"115 and that virtually all armed groups (primarily
the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP)
and the PARECO, or Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resis-
tance) have conducted "large-scale child recruitment" and "re-
recruitment" of former child soldiers.' 16 Among its recom-
mendations, the Group of Experts strongly urged that "Mem-
ber States take appropriate measures to ensure that exporters
and consumers of Congolese mineral products under their ju-
risdiction conduct due diligence on their suppliers and not ac-
cept verbal assurances from buyers regarding the origin of
their product."1 17 This recommendation was particularly sig-
nificant, since it implicitly underscored the preventive duties
and responsibilities of states with respect to armed groups'
global trade in facially licit goods. This recommendation took
a different direction from civil society groups' advocacy of cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) within the domestic jurisdic-
113. Brian Ashby, Program Assistant, Lecture at the University of Chicago
Summer Teacher Institute: From Congo to Chicago: Understanding the Life-Cycles
of Metal Commodities in the Global Economy, (June 22-25, 2009).
114. Note that the Congres national pour la defense du people is "a political
movement with a military wing call the Congolese National Army." U.N.
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo, letter dated Dec.
10, 2008 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established pur-
suant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of
Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, 1 19, 32, U.N.
Doc. S/2008/773, (Dec. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Group of Experts Report].
115. Id. 1 61.
116. See id. It 167-185 (discussing recruitment of child soldiers).
117. Id. at sec. XII.14 (emphasis in original).
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tional frameworks of states," 8 which seeks to establish host
state control and accountability mechanisms over multina-
tional corporations operating in a state's territory. The Group
of Experts' recommendation critically recognized that it was
the positive duty, or obligation, of states to require proper verifi-
cation of the origin or provenance of conflict-related goods.
Unlike CSR mechanisms which are negotiated, mobilized, and
mediated within states, the Group of Experts' recommenda-
tion was a landmark legal and policy development, since it im-
plied that states held a shared international obligation to pre-
vent inadvertently contributing to the financing of groups in
armed conflicts through international trade.
The Group of Experts' recommendation for proper verifi-
cation of the origin of conflict-related goods should also not
be seen hijowutf\as a mere magnified version of the KPCS sys-
tem on conflict diamonds. As previously discussed, the KPCS
system depends on the voluntary participation of states in its
certification process. Its constitutive processes are not legally
binding on states, and neither are its deliberations transparent
to the international community. States cannot, as a matter of
right, require the disclosure of information in relation to the
functioning of the KPCS system. When the Republic of Congo
was expelled from the KPCS in 2004 and readmitted in 2007,
KPCS officials did not offer any concrete explanation for these
decisions.119 As one NGO observes,
[t]he Kimberley Process was seriously flawed from
the beginning. The Kimberley system of "voluntary
self-regulation" on the part of the diamond industry
has meant a significant lack of transparency and inde-
pendent monitoring efforts. The World Diamond
Council, initially established to represent the dia-
mond industry at the Kimberley Process, has failed to
coordinate effective industry monitoring. Govern-
ments, too, have been uninterested in monitoring
and regulating the diamond trade. Some say the Kim-
118. See, e.g., Olefumi 0. Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility, Multinational
Corporations and the Law in Nigeria: Controlling Multinationals in Host States, 52
J. AFR. L. 1, 89-113 (2008) (examining the Nigerian legal framework for reg-
ulation of multinational corporations, and arguing that even well-developed
corporate responsibility practices by multinational corporations cannot re-
place the need for effective host state regulation).
119. Goldman, supra note 105, at 360.
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berley Process amounted to little more than a public
relations stunt for the diamond industry, and recent
reports by Global Witness and other NGOs have
found little evidence of genuine attempts to deliver
on industry commitments.o20
In contrast, the Group of Experts' recommendation for
state measures on due diligence verification, bans, and other
forms of quantitative restrictions against armed groups' trade
in commodities and minerals appears clearly premised on the
international obligations of all states under Security Council
resolutions in relation to the DRC, as well as the applicable
international humanitarian law conventions, including the
prohibitions against child soldiering.
While there is admittedly no specific set of international
regulations controlling armed groups' trade in facially licit
goods, the international responsibilities of states to take preven-
tive measures against such trade may be reasonably embraced
within the full range of international conventions and Security
Council resolutions on children and armed conflict. The Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child repeatedly obligates states
to take all necessary measures to "protect children from the
illicit use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances as de-
fined in the relevant international treaties, and to prevent the
use of children in the illicit production and trafficking of such
substances,"12 1 to ensure the implementation of the "right of
the child to be protected from economic exloitation and from
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to inter-
fere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's
health, or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social develop-
ment,"122 and in accordance with obligations under interna-
tional humanitarian law to protect the civilian population in
armed conflicts, to "take all feasible measures to ensure the
protection and care of children who are affected by an armed
conflict." 123 Imposing quantitative restrictions in armed
120. Kimberley Process, GLOBAL POLIcy FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.
org/component/content/article/182/33876.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2010).
121. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 11,
art. 33.
122. Id. art. 32.1.
123. Id. art. 38.4.
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groups' trade in facially licit goods produced through the par-
ticipation of child soldiers has also not been ruled out in the
encompassing language of the Optional Protocol to the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of chil-
dren in armed conflict, which provides, among others, that
states parties "shall take all necessary legal, administrative and
other measures to ensure the effective implementation and
enforcement of the provisions of the present Protocol within
its jurisdiction" 12 4 and "shall take all feasible measures to pre-
vent such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal
measures necessary to prohibit and criminalize such prac-
tices."1 25 Taking these child-specific international obligations
together with the Security Council's repeated resolutions obli-
gating states to bring an end to impunity for those responsible
for child soldiering, to implement "special measures" to pro-
tect children in armed conflict, and to take measures against
state and non-state actors that engage in illicit trade in natural
resources and small arms,126 collectively demonstrates the co-
rollary that states also bear international responsibility to re-
strict the flow of armed groups' trade in facially licit goods pro-
duced with the participation of child soldiers.
C. Synthesis: International Frameworks on the Control of
Financing of Armed Groups through Cross-Border Trade
As shown in the previous subsections, the descriptive sum-
maries of the relative international regulatory regimes applica-
ble to armed groups highlight several important distinctions in
the institutional enforcement of international prohibitions
124. Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, supra note 19, art. 6.1.
125. Id. art. 4.2.
126. See S.C. Res. 1261, supra note 32, 1J 3, 10 (urging "all parties to
armed conflicts to take special measures to protect children"); S.C. Res.
1314, supra note 32, 1 2, 16(c) ("Undertak[ing] initiatives to curb the cross-
border activities deleterious to children in times of armed conflict, such as
the cross-border recruitment and abduction of children"); S.C, Res. 1379,
supra note 32, 9(a)-(d) (urging states to consider taking measures that
protect "children in armed conflict"); S.C. Res. 1460, supra note 32, 1 3, 7
(urging conflict resolution to control arms trade with states that do not pro-
tect the rights of children); S.C. Res. 1539, supra note 32, 1 3-4 (calling
upon states to curb illicit trade, which can have a negative impact on chil-
dren); S.C Res. 1612, supra note 32, 11 14-16 (urging states to ensure that
children are embraced by peace process, unaffected by illicit trade, and
saved from abduction).
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against child soldiering. First, armed groups' trade in illicit
goods or prohibited substances such as drugs and small arms is
more easily distinguishable from other types of goods.
Whether these goods or substances were produced or distrib-
uted with child soldier intervention (as is more likely the case,
for example, in Burma, Colombia, Brazil, or the DRC), states
can ultimately prevent armed groups from profiting from the
labor of child soldiers in these goods through the per se ban on
the entry and subsequent sale of such goods into their respec-
tive territories. This is not necessarily the case with facially licit
goods such as minerals, natural resources, and other commod-
ities, where states inimitably have to determine for themselves
the origins or provenance of such goods. If such goods are
indeed attributable to child soldier labor for armed groups,
states must thereafter decide if they can lawfully impose quan-
titative restrictions against their entry, absent specific domestic
laws or customs regulations providing this effect within their
respective jurisdictions. (As I argue in Part III, states not only
have the capability to do this without infringing multilateral
trading rules, but they have the positive obligation to effectu-
ate such quantitative restrictions under the current architec-
ture of international prohibitions against child soldiering.)
Second, the highly centralized framework of cooperation
among states on prohibited substances appears more condu-
cive for states to obtain timely and updated information on
armed groups' trafficking activities. This level of information
exchange makes it easier for states to remain alert to the possi-
ble flow of such substances across or into their respective juris-
dictions. This is not the case with respect to armed groups'
trading activities in relation to facially licit goods, where there
is no such institutionalized cooperation or information ex-
change among states. The discovery of the "blood diamond"
trade as a source of armed groups' financing came midstream
into armed conflicts, sometimes decades after these conflicts
began as in the case of Sierra Leone, Angola, and the DRC.
The interchangeable terms "conflict diamonds" and
"blood diamonds" were originally used in connection with the
civil war in Angola. The link between the exploitation of dia-
mond resources and extensive human rights abuses was
brought to international attention by a U.N. Security Council
Expert Panel dealing with Angola. Nevertheless, the term
"blood diamonds" did not appear in any official U.N. docu-
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ment; instead it was a media creation that successfully and suc-
cinctly communicated the horror of the conflict.127
While in the past decade, the United Nations has facili-
tated dialogue and investigations into the linkages between
the exploitation of natural resources and armed conflicts,
there is no definitive database to date that authoritatively iden-
tifies and associates armed groups with various types of traded
facially-licit, traded goods. The length of years intervening be-
tween the release of U.N. Group of Experts' reports on armed
groups' exploitation of natural resources also creates bureau-
cratic and logistical obstacles for states bent on stopping the
flow of trade in their respective jurisdictions.
Finally, the absence of specific international rules onjuris-
diction, subject-matter, and settlement of disputes in relation
to restrictions on the flow of armed groups' trade in facially-
licit goods can dampen states' rigour and initiative in policing
the flow of such goods within their borders. Unlike trafficking
in prohibited substances, which is tightly regulated in an inter-
national scheduling, policing and monitoring system adminis-
tered by the International Narcotics Board and the Commis-
sion on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations, in cooperation with states, there is no
equivalent "red flag" system for trade in minerals and com-
modities. States are left to their own information and discre-
tion in determining whether or not to impose quantitative re-
strictions on minerals and commodities. Often as not, states
are loathe to resort to such restrictions for fear of being ac-
cused of violating multilateral trade rules and obligations in
the GATT, and provoking retaliatory measures from fellow
states affected by the restrictions.
As a consequence of the asymmetrical international regu-
lations on the flow of armed groups' trade in prohibited sub-
stances and facially licit goods, it should not be surprising that
armed groups continue to thrive even when forced to cut back
on the more high-risk trade in prohibited substances. Armed
groups' trade in facially licit goods such as minerals and com-
modities can be done innocuously with the complicity of front-
ing corporations or individuals that "legitimize" trade with in-
ternational counterpart entities on behalf of armed groups.
127. Iryna Marchuk, Confonting Blood Diamonds in Sierra Leone: The Trial of
Charles Taylor, 4 YALE J. INT'L Ave. 2, 88 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
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The magnitude of such trade barely registers in official govern-
ment economic statistics, unless the trade could be linked to
the suspicious involvement of high-ranking public figures.
This is precisely what unravelled in the case of Charles Taylor,
a former president of Liberia standing trial before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone. In January 2000, an NGO called Part-
nership Africa Canada first released its report on the financing
of armed conflict in Sierra Leone through Taylor's diamond
smuggling activities into neighboring Liberia. Two months
thereafter, the Angola Sanctions Committee presented the
U.N. Security Council with its Final Report (the "Fowler Re-
port") which drew similar conclusions, and also identified
heads of state, such as the presidents of Togo and Burkina
Faso, as violators of the U.N. sanctions regime. 128 Taylor was
reported to have backed the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) by providing assistance, supplying arms and ammuni-
tion in exchange for diamonds, and enlisting masses of child
soldiers to participate in the hostilities as well as to furnish la-
bor for diamond mining and quarrying.129
To date, more and more reports are surfacing on the fi-
nancing of armed conflicts through trade in facially licit
goods, such as the cocoa trade in CMte d'Ivoire,130 and the
128. See U.N. Panel of Experts on Violations of U.N. Security Council
Sanctions against UNITA, transmitted by letter dated Mar. 10, 2000 from the
Chairman of the Security Council Comm. established pursuant to resolution
864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola addressed to the president of
the Security Council, 11 32-35, 83, 101-103, 137, U.N. Doc. S/2000/203
(Mar. 10, 2000) (detailing various countries' violations of the U.N. sanctions
regime, including Togo and Burkina Faso).
129. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT, Second Amended
Indictment, 11 22, 26-27 (May 29, 2007) (alleging Taylor's responsibility for
use of children in hostilities and as forced laborers); see also U.S., Britain Say
Liberia's Charles Taylor Fuels War in Sierra Leone, CNN.com, (Jul. 31, 2000, 8:07
PM EDT), http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/07/31/le-
one.un.diamonds.reut/; Victor A. B. Davies, Sierra Leone: Ironic Tragedy, 9 J.
AFRN. ECON. 349, 358-359 (2000).
130. See, eg., Cocoa Seen Funding Ivory Coast Conflict, UPI.com, Jun. 8, 2007,
http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/Security-Industry/2007/06/08/Co-
coa-seen-funding-Ivory-Coast-conflict/UPI-53851181327698/; David
Bamford, Report Warns of "Conflict Cocoa", BBC NEWS, Jun. 8, 2007; GLOBAL
WrrNEss, HOT CHOCOLATE: How COCOA FUELLED THE CONFLICT IN CoTE
D'IVOIRE (2007), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/
FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/DHRV-73Y4WZ-full-report.pdf/$File/full re-
port.pdf; Lydia Polgreen, Ivory Coast: Cocoa Fueled Civil War, N.Y. TIMES, Jun.
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global timber trade from conflict zones in Africa and Asia.131
It is highly likely that armed groups engaged in protracted
conflicts will take advantage of the current regulatory gaps,
and shift more of their financing operations towards trade in
facially licit goods and commodities. In 2002, and well before
the KPCS came into being, a British NGO, Global Witness,
proposed a general framework for tracking the trade in goods
and commodities that finance armed conflict. Among their
recommendations, Global Witness stressed the need for har-
monization of reporting requirements, labelling procedures,
an audited chain of custody arrangements, international coop-
eration on information exchanges, transparency and account-
ability among participating states, and an internationalized
structure for monitoring the flow of such goods.132 Notably,
the proposal clarifies that eventual tracking mechanisms must
be WTO-compliant and harmonized with existing interna-
tional law.
International conflict policy experts remain optimistic
that "[t]argeting the finances of combatants may be a cost-ef-
fective means of influencing the behaviour of recalcitrant fac-
tions in civil conflicts. The required technology and expertise
are already highly developed in the context of drug traffickers
and terrorists and could be applied to belligerents."1 3 3 As I
show in Part III, states need not wait for the international com-
munity to reach a definitive consensus on how to fill in inter-
national regulatory gaps with respect to armed groups' trade
in facially licit goods. Even without more specialized interna-
tional treaty instruments, states can act within their respective
competencies to vindicate their shared international responsi-
bilities to prevent child soldiering. As recent literature sug-
9, 2007, at A5 (reporting on the facially-licit trading of cocoa in C6te
d'Ivoire).
131. See GLOBAL WITNESS, THE LOGS OF WAR: THE TIMBER TRADE AND
ARMED CONFLICT, 16, 23-24 (2002), available at http://www.illegal-log-
ging.info/uploads/Global Witness-_Logs-of War.pdf (describing logging
as facially licit goods in the context of Liberian civil conflict).
132. See Corene Crossin, et al., Where Did It Come from? Commodity Tracking
Systems, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFuCT: OPrlONS AND Ac-
TIONS 97, 97-159 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003).
133. David M. Malone & Jake Sherman, Economic Factors in Civil Wars: Pol-
icy Considerations, in RETHINKING THE ECONOMICS OF WAR: THE INTERSECTION
OF NEED, CREED, AND GREED 234, 241 (Cynthia J. Arnson & I. William
Zartman eds., 2005).
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gests, it is possible to track the movement of armed groups'
trade in facially licit goods using states' own customs pow-
ers.134 Applying the U.N. Group of Experts' recommendation,
states can also, of their own volition, require companies oper-
ating within their respective jurisdictions to conduct due dili-
gence and certify to domestic regulatory authorities that
facially licit goods and commodities were not sourced from
armed groups or their affiliated fronting companies as re-
ported by the U.N. Group of Experts. Finally, where states
have a reasonable basis to conclude that facially licit goods
produced or distributed through child soldier participation
have been traded by armed groups, they are well within their
authority and international responsibility to ban such trade.
Part III will show that while these domestic measures might
facially violate specific multilateral trade rules against non-dis-
crimination, prohibition against discriminatory and arbitrary
quantitative restrictions, and the most-favoured nation clause,
states could justify their measures by availing of the exceptions
clauses in GATT articles XX and XXI.
III. A PROPOSAL: WTO-COMPLIANT UNILATERAL MEASURES
To BAN, MONITOR, AND TRACK GOODS PRODUCED
OR DISTRIBUTED BY CHILD SOLDIERS
Treaties and instruments that provide for tracking, moni-
toring, and institutional enforcement mechanisms applicable
to specific substances, goods, or items are hardly new. They
frequently predominate in international environmental law,
most especially on issues of endangered species,' 35 genetically
modified organisms, 36 hazardous wastes 1 37 and chemicals, 138
134. Jonathan Winer, Tracking Conflict Commodities and Financing, in PROF-
ITING FROM PEACE: MANAGING THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIvIL WAR, supra
note 108, at 83.
135. See United Nations Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S.
243.
136. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000.
137. See 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Waste and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S.
57.
138. See 1998 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Pro-
cedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International
Trade, Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337.
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and ozone-depleting substances.139 However, there is no
counterpart binding, international regulatory framework in
place for tracking and monitoring armed groups' cross-border
trade in facially licit goods and commodities. Even the Euro-
pean Union, which pioneered fair trade labelling and eco-la-
belling, has not yet institutionalized policy instruments to ad-
dress this form of trade. 140
Current proposals to address this form of trade largely fo-
cus on the administrative regulation of corporations and other
entities that are implicated in armed groups' trading activities:
(1) initiatives that seek to increase payments and financial
transparency from natural resource corporations and govern-
ments in conflict zones;1 41 (2) heightened institutional over-
sight over financial aid extended by international develop-
ment agencies;142 (3) direct distribution of revenue resources
to citizens, bypassing government intermediation;I 43 (4)
strengthening citizen participation in public administrative
agencies that exercise oversight over natural resource corpora-
tions;144 and (5) general reforms of corporate practices, 145 as
seen in the United Nations Global Compact's Ten Princi-
ples,14 6 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises,147 the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
139. See 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
140. See Natalie Pauwels, Conflict Commodities: Addressing the Role of Natural
Resources in Conflict 3-9 (Int'l Security Info. Serv., Briefing Paper No. 27,
2003) (describing European Union measures currently in place to prevent
trade from supporting conflict, and making recommendations to address
gaps).
141. Macartan Humphreys, Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts: Issues and
Options, in PROFITING FROM PEACE: MANAGING THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF
CIVIL WAR, supra note 108, at 25, 28.
142. Id. at 29.
143. Id. at 30.
144. Id. at 29.
145. Id. at 33-34.
146. See UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY 1 (2008), http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/
news_events/8.1/GCbrochureFINAL.pdf.
147. See ORGANIZATION OF EcoNoMIc CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
GUIDELINES ON MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISEs (2008) [hereinafter OECD
GUIDELINES].
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(EITI) Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions, 14 8 and the
U.N. Subcommission on Human Rights' draft Norns on the Re-
sponsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enter-
prises with Regard to Human Rights.149 As of this writing, current
international initiatives remain in their nascent stages. The
previously discussed non-binding certification process in the
KPCS system for conflict diamonds requires improvement, and
although a U.N. Small Arms Treaty regained momentum after
the United States reversed its position and declared its support
in 2009, the drafting process is still ongoing.15 0 U.N. experts
have advocated an international agreement on small arms and
light weapons to reduce, if not eliminate, the global incidence
of child soldiering. 51 These measures are more general and
universal in scope, in contrast to the U.N. Security Council's
conflict- or region-specific measures. 152
148. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative London Conference,
June 17, 2003, Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions.
149. Comm'n on Human Rights, Subcomm'n on the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
55th Sess., Aug. 13, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2.
150. Bill Varner, US Backs Arms Trade Treaty at the U.N., Abandoning Bush
Opposition, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 30, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=abkyS4.975YM.
151. Suzanne Hoeksema, Arms Treaty Could Be Powerful Tool to Protect Chil-
dren, IPS, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=
48970.
152. See S.C. Res. 1643, supra note 67 (threatening sanctions against indi-
viduals violating the arms embargo or the peace process in C6te d'lvoire by
broadening the embargo to include diamond exports); S.C. Res. 1343, supra
note 66 (imposing sanctions on Monrovia for aiding the Revolutionary
United Front in Sierra Leone); S.C. Res. 1306, supra note 64 (banning dia-
mond trading in Sierra Leone); see also U.N. Group of Experts on C6te
d'Ivoire, Rep., transmitted by letter dated Nov. 7, 2005 from the Chairman
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572
(2004) concerning C6te d'Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security
Council, f 48-51, U.N. Doc. S/2005/699 (Nov. 7, 2005); U.N. Group of
Experts on Liberia, Rep., transmitted by letter dated Apr. 19, 2002 from the
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolu-
tion 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of the Se-
curity Council, 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/2000/470 (Apr. 19, 2002); U.N. Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Add., transmitted by letter
dated Nov. 10, 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Se-
curity Council, 11 36-37, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1072 (Nov. 13, 2001); U.N.
Group of Experts on Liberia, Rep., transmitted by letter dated Oct. 26, 2001
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All of these initiatives contribute, regardless of degree, to
the creation of economic disincentives to armed groups that
enlist child soldiers. It would be equally desirable for the in-
ternational community to reach agreement that enhances co-
operation, monitoring, and enforcement on armed groups'
trade in facially licit goods and commodities, similar to the
tightly synchronized normative and institutional network on
international drug trafficking. Pending such an agreement,
however, I submit that states have the capability to impose a
range of domestic measures designed to prevent and deter fa-
cilitating armed groups' trade in such child soldier-produced
or -distributed goods and commodities, and are justified in do-
ing so under international economic law. The next subsection
outlines possible features of such domestic measures, followed
by a subsection discussing how these measures comply with
multilateral trading rules.
A. Possible Domestic Measures Against Armed Groups' Trade in
Facially Licit Goods
Policy analysts have offered numerous recommendations
that states can adopt to track the flow of armed groups' trade
in facially licit goods and commodities. Jonathan Winer pro-
poses a customs-based regime, using Unique Consignment
Reference (UCR) and Container Security Initiative (CSI).153
Developed in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the
World Customs Organization (WCO) administers UCRs for
many customs jurisdictions throughout the world. 154
A UCR number is the equivalent of a bar code applied as
early as possible to track all international movements of goods
from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolution 1343 (2001) concerning Liberia addressed to the President of
the Security Council, 1 351, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1015 (Oct. 26, 2001); U.N.
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rep., transmit-
ted by letter dated Apr. 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President
of the Security Council, 1 109-212, U.N. Doc. S/2001/357 (Apr. 12, 2001).
153. Winer, supra note 134, at 69, 83-89; see also Clyde McElman, Trade
Corridor Transparency and Security, 8 THE INNOVATIONJ. 4 (2003) (arguing for
enhancements to the Unique Consignment Reference); WORLD CUSTOMS
ORGANIZATION [WCO], WCO UNIQUE CONSIGNMENT REFERENCE (2004).
154. See generally WCO, UNIQUE CONSIGNMENT REFERENCE (2004) (provid-
ing an overview of UCRs).
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for which customs control is required and then used as an ac-
cess key for audit, consignment tracking, and information rec-
onciliation. By requiring every good moving in international
trade to have a unique number attached to it, the UCR system
would create a mechanism to monitor and track the identity
and movement of goods by region, by country, by type of
good, by seller, by buyer, by shipper, or by any other broadly
useful characteristic.15 5
On the other hand, the Container Security Initiative
(CSI) is the brainchild of the United States government, a sys-
tem designed to enhance the security of sea cargo containers
by pre-screening high-risk containers and employing advanced
detection technology to uncover hidden contraband. 15 6 CSI-
compliance standards have already been adopted in at least
forty-four of the world's largest seaports, 157 while UCRs have
already been tested and deployed in several jurisdictions.15 8
[UCR] could potentially be applied to goods moving
across national borders not only in containers and
barrels but in briefcases and envelopes: all that is re-
quired is the international political will to mandate
the use of UCR numbers for all commercial ship-
ments of all types of goods across borders. When the
activities of particular firms have been found to be
suspect, their use of the UCR system would be pro-
hibited, and any effort at further evasion would nec-
essarily involve falsification of UCR documentation.
Once a customs agency detects improper UCR docu-
mentation, other UCR documentation with the same
characteristics could then be traced and matched to
containers, and the ports participating in the CSI
155. Winer, supra note 134, at 84.
156. Id. at 84-85.
157. See Nicholas Hughes Allen, The Container Security Initiative: Costs, Im-
plications, and Relevance to Developing Countries, 26 PUB. ADMIN. & DEv. 445,
445 (2006) (listing, inter alia, Singapore, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, as ports
that have adopted the compliance standards).
158. See Juha Hintsa & Dietmar Jost, Impact Analysis of Two World Custom
Organization Technical Instruments - Customs Data Model and Unique Consign-
ment Reference - On Customs Operations and Performance: Survey at 18 Customs
Administrations, 3183 LEcruRE NoTEs IN COMPUTER Sci. 134, 134 (2004)
(presenting the results of a survey of experts regarding the potential impacts
of UCR on customs administrations).
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could treat this information as a red flag to apply to
any containers relating to the persons, entities, or
goods covered by the suspect UCR documenta-
tion.159
Using UCR and CSI technologies, customs authorities
could distinguish armed groups' trade in facially licit child sol-
dier-produced or -distributed goods from legitimate trade in
goods. Armed groups' trade in such goods could be better
detected at the border where such goods lack proper UCR and
CSI documentation, or where they do not match the corre-
sponding UCR and CSI databases of customs authorities.
Another measure that states could consider is to work
with multinational enterprises to encourage them not to inad-
vertently or deliberately purchase such goods. Patricia Feeney
and Tom Kenny theorize the possible application of the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises to corporate
conduct in conflict zones.16 0 Among its many recommenda-
tions for business practices, the OECD Guidelines encourage
multinational enterprises to "respect the human rights of
those affected by their activities consistent with the host gov-
ernment's international obligations and commitments";161
"abstain from any improper involvement in local political ac-
tivities"; 162 "ensure that timely, regular, reliable and relevant
information is disclosed regarding their activities, structure, fi-
nancial situation and performance";1 63 and "within the frame-
work of [the] applicable law, regulations and prevailing labour
relations and employment practices ... contribute to the effec-
tive abolition of child labour ... [and] contribute to the elimi-
nation of all forms of forced or compulsory labour."16 These
Guidelines "apply not only to companies operating in adher-
ing countries but also to companies based in adhering coun-
tries operating in any other country. In this way, their scope
159. Winer, supra note 134, at 85.
160. See Patricia Feeney & Tom Kenny, Conflict Management and the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in PROFITING FROM PEACE: MANAGING
THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR, supra note 108, at 345, 346-52 (dis-
cussing the ways in which the OECD guidelines may or may not apply to
corporate conduct).
161. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 147, ch. 11.2.
162. Id. ch. II.11.
163. Id. ch. 111.1.
164. Id. ch. IV.1(b)-(c).
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includes company operations in non-adhering countries,
where most of today's conflicts take place."1 65 While the
Guidelines comprise a set of recommendations OECD govern-
ments have agreed upon in encouraging corporate conduct,
there is nothing barring individual states from formally legis-
lating the key measures to make them legally binding within
their respective jurisdictions. Conflict-relevant provisions in
the OECD Guidelines that could be useful to stopping the flow
of armed groups' trade in facially licit goods and commodities
include its Chapter VI provisions on combating bribery and
establishing proper auditing and accountability practices; 1 6 6
Chapter III provisions on disclosure regarding enterprises' ac-
tivities, structure, financial situation and performance;1 6 7
Chapter IV provisions on contributing to the effective aboli-
tion of child labor;16 8 Chapter V provisions on environmental
activities; 16 9 and most importantly, the Chapter II provisions
on general policies, including "respect [for] the human rights
of those affected by their activities consistent with the host gov-
ernment's international obligations and commitments."17 0
Finally, combining the U.N. Group of Experts' 2008 rec-
ommendation with some features of the certification system in
KPCS, states can themselves design measures purposefully re-
quiring exporters and consumers of commodities to certify
that they have conducted due diligence on their respective
supply chains and have ensured, to the best of their knowledge
that none of their known suppliers of primary or intermediate
goods or commodities are linked, affiliated, or otherwise used
to finance armed groups' trade in goods produced or distrib-
uted by child soldiers. Such a certification system, even if lo-
calized for now to particular states that undertake to adopt it,
eventually could be developed toward a common international
customs database on exporters, consumers, goods, and supply
chains. Where such certifications cannot be produced, a state
could prohibit the entry of such non-certified goods into its
territory for a certain period while the source and transmission
channels used for the goods in question are investigated. The
165. Feeney & Kenny, supra note 160, at 347.
166. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 147, ch. VI.
167. Id. ch. III.
168. Id. ch. IV.I(b).
169. Id. ch. V.
170. Id. ch. 11.2.
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next subsection discusses salient considerations in devising
these processes, to avoid non-conformity with GATT Articles
XI or III.
To date, modern certification systems in some countries
such as the United States and E.U. countries have incre-
mentally expanded beyond conflict diamonds to gemstones
and minerals.171 Considering the presence of various regional
and bilateral customs cooperation agreements today that
tackle related issues of fraud, money laundering, and the flow
of illegal goods and contraband, it is not too remote to envis-
age a situation in the future where states that internally impose
domestic measures to stop the flow of armed groups' trade in
goods and commodities produced or distributed by child
soldiers could subsequently build on regulatory experiences
and possibly extend cooperation in these matters as part of the
scope of their international customs agreements with fellow
states.
Regardless of the qualitative contours of the domestic
measure that a state might impose in relation to armed
groups' trade in facially licit goods produced or distributed by
child soldiers, the state will inevitably have to ensure that this
trade restriction does not violate multilateral trade rules. The
next section discusses a state's possible justifications, under the
Exceptions Clauses of GATT articles XX and XXI, for unilater-
ally imposing trade restrictions against commodities and goods
produced or distributed by child soldiers. Before proceeding
to discuss these exceptions, however, I first discuss possible
GATT-compliant design features for border measures that cus-
toms authorities could implement to prevent the flow of such
goods into their respective territories.
171. See Richard A. Schroeder, Tanzanite as a Conflict Gem: Certifying a Se-
cure Commodity Chain in Tanzania, 41 GEOFORUM 56, 60-61 (2010) (discussing
the Tuscon Tanzanite Protocol); Philippe Le Billon, Fatal Transactions: Con-
flict Diamonds and the (Anti)Terrorist Consumer, 38 ANTIPODE 778, 786 (2006)
(describing activism leading to the creation of the Kimberley Process).
There is also some movement to address other natural resources, such as
timber, but the regulatory response has been slow. See Steven Price et al.,
Confronting Conflict Timber, in EXTREME CONFLICT AND TROPICAL FoREsTs 117
(Wil de Jong et al. eds., 2007).
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B. Mapping GATT/WTO Conformity for Unilateral Measures
Against Trade in Goods Produced or Distributed
by Child Soldiers
States imposing trade restrictions on the flow of goods
and commodities can anticipate challenges based on the fol-
lowing core norms of GATT law:
* The Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses of Article
I:1;172
* Article XI:1, which is the cornerstone prohibition
against quantitative restrictions;1 73
* Article XIII:1, which further qualifies that quantitative
restrictions should be non-discriminatorily adminis-
tered;174
* Article III:4, which mandates national treatment for
non-fiscal measures imposed after post-customs clear-
ance and which affect the offer, sale, transportation,
distribution or use of an imported product;175
172. GATT, art. 1:1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 ("With
respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connec-
tion with importation or exportation or imposed on the international trans-
fer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities
in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all mat-
ters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any [Member] to any product originating
in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other [Members]."); see also RAj BiHA, MODERN GATT LAw: A TREA-
TISE ON THE GENERAL AGREEMENTS ON TARFFS AND TRADE 44 (2005).
173. GATT, supra note 172, art. XI:1 ("No prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or
maintained by any [Member] on the importation of any product of the terri-
tory of any other [Member] or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other [Member]."); see alSo BHALA,
supra note 172, at 356.
174. GATT, supra note 172, art. XIII:1 ("No prohibition or restriction shall
be applied by any [Member] on the importation of any product of the terri-
tory of any other [Member] or on the exportation of any product destined
for the territory of any other [Member], unless the importation of the like
product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all
third countries is similarly prohibited or restricted."); see also BHALA, supra
note 172, at 393.
175. GATT, supra note 172, art. III:4 ("The products of the territory of any
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party
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* Article X:3(a), which prohibits the arbitrary applica-
tion of trade measures;176 and
* Article VIII:1(c) and article VIII:3,177 which, when
read together, stresses the need for uniform and pro-
portional rules on customs formalities and proce-
dures.
Absent specific details on a state's chosen design for quan-
titative restrictions for goods produced or distributed by child
soldiers, it is impossible to determine a priori how a given re-
striction would comply with the foregoing norms. While there
is, to date, no jurisprudence applicable to these provisions of
GATT law on such goods, states should nevertheless also be
mindful of some WTO decisions on quantitative restrictions
that might affect how they ultimately design quantitative mea-
sures or restrictions. Let us assume that a state can choose to
implement any or all of the following set of domestic mea-
sures:
* An outright ban on goods produced or distributed by
child soldiers, as identified at the border (presumably
using UCR or CSI technologies);
* A KPCS-like certification system applicable at customs
inspection, which requires foreign and local compa-
nies trading in facially licit goods or commodities (and
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations, and require-
ments affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transporta-
tion, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent
the application of differential internal transportation charges which are
based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and
not on the nationality of the product."); see also BoA, supra note 172, at
135.
176. GATT', supra note 172, art. X:3(a) ("Each [Member] shall administer
in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, deci-
sions, and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article."); see
also BHALA, supra note 172, at 460.
177. GATT, supra note 172, art. VIII:1 (c) ("The [Members] ... recognize
the need for minimizing the incidence and complexity of import and export
formalities and for decreasing and simplifying import and export documen-
tation requirements."); art. VIII:3 ("No [Member] shall impose substantial
penalties for minor breaches of customs regulations or procedural require-
ments. In particular, no penalty in respect of any omission or mistake in
customs documentation which is easily rectifiable and obviously made with-
out fraudulent intent or gross negligence shall be greater than necessary to
serve merely as a warning."); see also BuALA, supra note 172, at 524.
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which might belong to the same category of conflict
goods or commodities as reported to the UN Security
Council, such as timber, diamonds and other miner-
als, and oil),178 to certify to the state to which such
goods or commodities are being imported that the
goods or commodities were not produced or distrib-
uted by child soldiers;
* Non-fiscal measures that apply after goods and com-
modities have cleared customs, which require foreign
and local companies to report that they have con-
ducted due diligence to verify that their supply chains
do not include goods produced or distributed by child
soldiers.
Each of the above measures, albeit generally described,
could respectively yield potential GATT violations. In the fol-
lowing subsections, I present several ways in which these mea-
sures could be GATT/WTO-compliant, and within the scope
of the corresponding jurisprudential interpretations issued in
the applicable Panel Reports and the Appellate Body Reports.
178. See supra notes 77-87, 110, 130, 128, 134-139 and accompanying text;
see also S.C. Res. 1625, 1 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1625 (Sept. 14, 2005) ("[The
Security Council] reaffirms its determination to take action against illegal
exploitation and trafficking of natural resources and high-value commodi-
ties in areas where it contributes to the outbreak, escalation or continuation
of armed conflict."); U.N. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Interim Rep., transmitted by letter dated Jan 25, 2007 from the
Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolu-
tion 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, 11 18-22, S/2007/40, Jan.
31, 2007 [hereinafter DRC Interim Report]. For further discussions of con-
flict commodities as observed from civil wars or internal armed conflicts, see
also Michael Ross, How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from
Thirteen Cases, 58 INr'L ORG. 35, 48 tbl.2 (2004); Governance of Natural Re-
sources Revenues, Paris, Fr., Dec. 9-10, 2002, Michael Ross, Natural Resources
and Civil War: An Overview with Some Policy Options 21-22 (Dec. 13, 2002). See
generally PHILIPPE LE BILLON, FUELLING WAR: NATURAL RESOURCES AND ARMED
CONFLICT (2005). For an overview of commodity-tracking regimes, see gen-
erally Corene Crossin et al., Where Did it Come From? Commodity Tracking Sys-
tems, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLIcr: OPTIONS AND AcriONS
97 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003).
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1. Outright Ban on Goods Identifiably Produced or Distributed by
Child Soldiers
The ideal administrative design features for a state-im-
posed domestic measure against goods produced or distrib-
uted by child soldiers, consistent with the latest interpretations
of WTO panels on specific GATT principles on quantitative
restrictions, could be the subject of an entirely separate
study. 179 For purposes of this subsection's analysis, I refer to a
ban against the import of goods identifiably produced by or
distributed through child soldiers.
An outright ban on goods that are identifiably produced
or distributed by child soldiers is vulnerable to allegations of
violating primarily GATT article 1:1 (the most favoured nation
clause), GATT article XI: 1 (the core prohibition against quan-
titative restrictions), GATT article XIII:1 (which requires non-
discriminatory administration of any permissible quantitative
restrictions), and GATT article X:3(a) (which prohibits the ar-
bitrary application of trade measures). In all of these alleged
violations, the core issue will be the state's rules of origin in
determining the provenance of goods produced or distributed
by child soldiers. As defined by the World Trade Organization
(WTO), rules of origin are "the criteria needed to determine
the national source of the product."' 80 GATT does not provide
for these rules, leaving member states "free to determine its
own origin rules ... even [to] maintain several different rules
179. Useful insights can be drawn from the already extensive literature on
possible administrative and institutional designs for control, tracking, and
restriction of trade in conflict goods, commodities, and natural resources.
See generally U.S.A.I.D., JAMIE THOMSON & RAMZy KANAAN, CONFLICT TIMBER:
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM IN ASIA AND AFRICA: SYNTHESIs REPORt (2003);
DRC Interim Report, supra note 178, annx. 1 (providing a sample geochemi-
cal analysis control system for minerals, as designed by the Soci6t6 G6ndrale
de Surveillance); Crossin, supra note 178 (discussing commodity tracking sys-
tems); Carola Kantz, The Power of Socialization: Engaging the Diamond Industry
in the Kimberley Process, 9 Bus. POWER & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE art. 2 (2007);
Pauwels, supra note 140 (discussing the role of natural resources in armed
conflicts); Steven Price et al., Confronting Conflcit Timber, in EXTREME CON-
FLICT AND TROPICAL FORESTS 126-131 (Wil de Jong, Deanna Donovan, & Ken-
ichi Abe eds., 2007) (reviewing measures for tracking and verifying conflict
timber); Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and the
Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDozo L. REv. 1717 (2010).
180. Technical Information on Rules of Origin, WTO, http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop-e/roi_e/roi-infoe.htm (last visited 1 May 2010).
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of origin depending on the purpose of the particular regula-
tion."' 8
To illustrate the potential violations, let us assume that
State A imposes an outright ban on goods from State X, alleg-
ing that such goods from State X were produced or distributed
by child soldiers. The ban facially violates the MFN guarantee
under GATT article 1:1, since State A discriminates against
such goods originating from a particular State X, thereby giv-
ing preferential treatment to all other states exporting the
same goods. State X can also argue that the ban is an imper-
missible quantitative restriction under GATT article XI:1, such
ban not being a duty, tax, or other similar charge.182 Even if
such ban could ever be deemed as a permissible quantitative
restriction, State X could argue that State A violates GATT arti-
cle XIII: 1 by discriminating in its administration of the ban, if
State A does not extend the same ban on other similar goods
or like products from all other states. Finally, if State A does
not observe a form of procedural due process in its administra-
tion of the ban, State X could argue that State A violates its
GATT article X:3(a) obligation to "administer in a uniform,
impartial, and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, deci-
sions, and rulings" as defined in GATT article X:1 (in this case,
the prohibition of imports).
State A's proffered substantive reason for the disparate
treatment of such goods (such as the use of child soldiers in
the production or distribution of such goods), must therefore
be justified on other GATT provisions. I propose that articles
XX(a), XX(d), and XXI(b) might furnish legal bases for a
state's imposition of a domestic measure curtailing the flow of
armed groups' trade in facially licit goods that were produced
or distributed by child soldiers. As there is, to date, no compa-
rable jurisprudence on armed groups' trade in such goods and
commodities, these interpretive arguments might have persua-
sive value for states considering quantitative restrictions on the
trade of such goods and commodities. The following subsec-
181. Id.
182. Cf PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT AND THE
OTHER AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE IN GOODS 50-51 (2007) (explaining
that, generally, the prohibition on quantitative restrictions applies to those
measures imposed by governments that are not duties, taxes, or other
charges) [hereinafter MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS].
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tions separately sketch interpretive theories under the General
Exceptions provision of article XX from the Security Excep-
tions provision of article XXI.
a. General Exceptions: Articles XX(a) and XX(d)
GATT article XX furnishes exceptions that apply to "all
obligations under the General Agreement: the national treat-
ment obligation and the most-favoured nation obligation, of
course, but others as well."' 83 WTO jurisprudence has devel-
oped a two-tiered test for interpreting GATT article XX, other-
wise known as the General Exceptions clause. GATT article
XX contains a general chapeau ("Subject to the requirement that
such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any [Member] of measures. . .") and
ten specifically enumerated exceptions, (a) to (j). The settled
two-tiered methodology first requires that a measure be provi-
sionally evaluated or justified according to the specific excep-
tion. If the measure is found to be provisionally justified
under the specific exception, then the next step would be to
test the measure's compliance with the requirements of the
chapeau.18 4
The WTO Appellate Body recognizes the differentiated
language within article XX, with the specific exceptions re-
spectively carrying different qualifiers, such as "necessary," "es-
sential," "relating to," "for the protection of" "in pursuance of" and
"involving."'85 These differences in terminology would bear
183. Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 24 WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 22, 1996) [hereinafter U.S.-
Gasoline AB Report]. But see PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE GENERAL AGREE-
MENT ON TARiFFs AND TRADE: A COMMENTARY 185-86, 257-59 (2005) (taking a
minority position against prevailing jurisprudential interpretations on the
wholesale applicability of GATT art. XX) [hereinafter MAVROIDIs, GATT
COMMENTARY].
184. Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, It 118-120, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp AB Report].
185. U.S.-Gasoline AB Report at 17.
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upon the corresponding interpretive test that would be ap-
plied for each of the specific exceptions. 86
Article XX's drafting history shows that states were moti-
vated by the desire to meet particular conditions existing in
specific countries in construing exceptions from multilateral
trade obligations under the GATT.1 87 The chapeau is in-
tended to guard against the abusive interpretation of any of
the itemized exceptions:
[t]he chapeau is animated by the principle that while
the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as a
matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as
to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the
holder of the right under the substantive rule of the
General Agreement. If those exceptions are not to be
abused or misused, in other words, the measures fall-
ing within the particular exceptions must be applied
reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties
of the party claiming the exception and the legal
rights of the other parties concerned.18s
The particular phraseology of the chapeau in article XX
"embodies the recognition on the part of WTO Members of
the need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations be-
tween the right of a Member to invoke one or another of the
exceptions under Article XX, specified in paragraphs (a) to
(j), on the other hand, and the substantive rights of the other
Members under the GATT 1994, on the other hand."189
With these methodological interpretations in mind, we
can provisionally scrutinize a state's quantitative restriction
against goods produced or distributed by child soldiers at its
most extreme application-in this case, an outright ban on
such goods-and determine whether it can be justified under
article XX. For purposes of this legal analysis, I assume that
the state has duly identified the origin or provenance of such
goods as attributable to an armed group that enlists child
soldiers for its operations. I submit that the measure could be
embraced under the "public morals" exception in article
186. Id. at 18.
187. See BHALA, supra note 172, at 531-533.
188. U.S.-Gasoline AB Report at 22.
189. U.S.-Shrimp AB Report 1 156.
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XX(a), and also the "customs enforcement" exception in arti-
cle XX(d).
i. The "Public Morals" Exception in Article XX(a)
Until the August 2009 Panel Report in China-Measures Af-fecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publica-
tions and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, there was no availa-
ble jurisprudence interpreting GATT article XX(a).190 The
Appellate Body in Korea-Various Measures on Beefand EC-Asbestos
generally recognized that WTO Members have the right to de-
termine the level of protection they consider appropriate inso-
far as other specific exceptions in GATT article XX were con-
cerned.1 91 At best, scholars analogized WTO jurisprudence
that interpreted a similarly worded provision in the General
Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) article XIV(a)
("measures necessary to protect public morals or to maintain
public order").192 The Panel in US-Gambling interpreted the
"public morals" exception as one that requires a measure
"must be aimed at protecting the interests of the people within
a community or a nation as a whole," such that "the term 'pub-
190. See Panel Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distri-
bution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
7.746-.759, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009) (analysing in Art. XX(a), and re-
ferring to GATS XIV(a) jurisprudence to determine the meaning of "public
morals") [hereinafter China-Publications Panel Report]; see also Appellate
Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, t 336-37, WT/
DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) (departing from the Panel's GATT article
XX(a) only insofar as "the State plan requirement in Article 42 of the Publi-
cations Regulation ... can be characterized as "necessary" to protect public
morals in China").
191. Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chil-
led, and Frozen Beef 1 176, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11
2000) [hereinafter Korea-Beef AB Report]; Appellate Body Report, European
Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, 1
168, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos AB Re-
port].
192. See Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of 'Necessary' in GATT Article XX and
GATS Article XV- The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WoRLD TRADE REv. 3
(2007), at 347, 350 (applying the U.S.-Gambling Appellate Body's analysis of
GATS XIV(a) in order analyse "necessary" in GATT XX); Julia Ya Qin, Defin-
ing Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization, 23 B.U.
INT'L L. J. 215, 252-73 (2005) (juxtaposing the similar approaches to non-
discrimination between GATT art. XX and GATS art. XIV).
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lic morals' denotes standards of right and wrong conduct
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation." 9 3 The
Appellate Body in US-Gambling also laid the balancing test for
determining the "necessity" of a measure to the objective of
protecting public morals:
306. The process begins with an assessment of the
'relative importance' of the interests or values fur-
thered by the challenged measure. Having ascer-
tained the importance of the particular interests at
stake, a panel should then turn to the other factors
that are to be 'weighed and balanced.' The Appel-
late Body has pointed to two factors that, in most
cases, will be relevant to a panel's determination of
the 'necessity' of a measure, although not necessarily
exhaustive of factors that might be considered. One
factor is the contribution of the measure to the reali-
zation of the ends pursued by it; the other factor is
the restrictive impact of the measure on international
commerce.
307. A comparison between the challenged measure
and possible alternatives should then be undertaken,
and the results of such comparison should be consid-
ered in the light of the importance of the interests at
issue. It is on the basis of this 'weighing and balanc-
ing' and comparison of measures, taking into ac-
count the interests or values at stake, that a panel de-
termines whether a measure is 'necessary' or, alterna-
tively, whether another, WTO-consistent measure is
'reasonably available.' 19 4
In the absence of WTO jurisprudence specifically inter-
preting GATT article XX(a) until August 2009 in China-Publi-
cations, some scholars have argued that this "public morals" ex-
ception could be used tojustify adopting or maintaining a ban
on products of child labor, such as blood diamonds. 195 I sub-
193. Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, i 6.463, 6.465, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
194. Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Bor-
der Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 1 1306-07, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr.
7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Gambling AB Report].
195. E.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Human Rights Sanctions and International
Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. Ir'L ECON. L. 133, 157-59 (2002); Ste-
phen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organization
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mit that even the WTO Panel's interpretation of article XX(a)
in China-Publications would not rule out a ban on goods pro-
duced or distributed by child soldiers.
China invoked article XX(a) to justify a set of measures
which regulated the entry of foreign publications, audiovisuals
and other media forms, contending that "Chinese regulations
governing the importation of cultural goods establish a con-
tent review mechanism and a system for the selection of im-
port entities directed at protecting public morals in China."
China advanced the argument that, "cultural goods are unique
in that they may have a potentially serious impact on societal
and individual morals.... [I]mported cultural goods, because
they are vectors of different cultural values, may collide with
standards of right and wrong conduct which are specific to
China."196 The Panel noted that the United States did not spe-
cifically challenge the nature of the measures and their
linkage to the objective of protecting public morals, but in-
stead "challenged the means China has chosen to achieve its
objective of protecting public morals. More particularly, the
United States argues that it is not 'necessary' within the mean-
ing of Article XX(a) for importers to perform content review
... [which] is independent of importation and can be per-
formed by individuals or entities unrelated to the importation
process."19 7 The Panel then proceeded to explicitly adopt the
very same definition of "public morals" that was set by the Ap-
pellate Body in US-Gambling in relation to GATS article
XIV(a).'9s Since the United States did not specifically deny
that the measures had a link to China's public morals objec-
tive, the issue became the "necessity" of the measures China
Rules, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 223 (2004) ("Article XX(a) likely. . .would
support state action on a number of other human rights concerns, which
might prompt a WTO Member to ban trade to protest immoral acts by a
foreign government against its citizens, such as products made by inden-
tured children or from countries. . ."); Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert
Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261, 290
(2005); see also PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 615 (2005).
196. China-Publications Panel Report 1 7.712.
197. Id at 1 7.756.
198. Id. at 1 7.759 ("Since Article XX(a) uses the same concept as Article
XIV(a), and since we see no reason to depart from the interpretation of
"public morals" developed by the panel in US - Gambling, we adopt the same
interpretation for purposes of our Article XX(a) analysis.").
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chose to advance its public morals objective, as to bring them
within the purview of article XX(a).
The China-Publications Panel adopted the same "necessity"
test in US-Gambling, but added another factor, "the restriction
on the right to import," to US-Gambling's two factors (the con-
tribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued
by it, and the restrictive impact of the measure on interna-
tional commerce):
We recall that we have agreed to proceed on the as-
sumption that Article XX is available as a direct de-
fence for measures that are inconsistent with China's
trading rights commitments under the Accession Pro-
tocol. Therefore, and consistently with the statement
by the Appellate Body in US-Gambling, we think that
in the case before us, an additional factor should be
taken into account. Specifically, we think that we
should weigh not only the restrictive impact the mea-
sures at issue have on imports of relevant products,
but also the restrictive effect they have on those wish-
ing to engage in importing, in particular on their
right to trade. In our view, if Article XX is assumed
to be a direct defence for measures in breach of trad-
ing rights commitments, it makes sense to consider how
much these measures restrict the right to import. This would
appear to parallel a situation where imposes a WTO-
inconsistent ban on imports of products and where
an article XX defence requires examination of how
much the ban restricts imports of those same prod-
ucts.199
The China-Publications Panel added the above factor (e.g.
restrictions on the right to import) from its reading of China's
argument that the import restrictions were "necessary to en-
sure that the content review can be performed in respect of
relevant imported products in a manner which achieves the
high level of protection China seeks to achieve."200 After
weighing all three factors against the particular design of each
measure, and further inquiring whether there were any other
reasonably available measures to China, the Panel concluded
199. Id. at 1 7.788.
200. Id. at 1 7.791.
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that "none of the provisions of China's measures which we
have determined to be inconsistent with China's trading rights
commitments under the Accession Protocol is 'necessary'
within the meaning of article XX(a)."201
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential developments to
the interpretation of article XX(a), a state's ban on goods pro-
duced or distributed by child soldiers could meet both the
"public morals" definition20 2 and the balancing test for "neces-
sity." As previously discussed, the international prohibitions
against child soldiering extend to all "necessary" measures that
prevent the use of children in this "worst form of child la-
bour."20 A state-imposed ban on such goods can be readily
subsumed within the "public morals" definition for GATT arti-
cle XX(a), as the enforcement of international prohibitions
against child soldiering directly implicate "standards of right
and wrong conduct maintained on behalf of a community or
nation." The fact that the majority of states throughout the
world have obligated themselves to prohibit and outlaw child
soldiering through numerous international treaty instruments
sufficiently demonstrates how they have agreed to characterize
standards of conduct in relation to child soldiering.
Likewise, a state-imposed ban could meet the three previ-
ously described aspects of the balancing test for the "necessity"
of a measure. A ban "contributes to the realization of the
ends," or the objective of enforcing both international
prohibitions against child soldiering and international respon-
sibilities to prevent child soldiering under current treaty in-
struments such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child involving children and armed conflict.
By denying such goods access to the flow of trade, states en-
sure that armed groups do not profit from the exploitation of
201. Id. at 1 7.911.
202. Cf Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L
L. 689, 740-42 (1998) (arguing that products of slave labor and indentured
children could be embraced within the GATT article XX(a) "public morals"
exception).
203. E.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
note 11, art. 38-39; Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, supra note
19, art. 4.2, 6.1; S.C. Res. 1261, supra note 32, 3, 10; S.C. Res. 1314, supra
note 32; S.C. Res. 1379, supra note 32, 9(a)-(d); S.C. Res. 1460, supra note
32, 3, 7; S.C. Res. 1539, supra note 32, 3-4; S.C. Res. 1612, supra note
32, 11 14-15.
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child soldiers for all activities and operations that sustain their
participation in armed conflict. When a state can properly dis-
tinguish the origin of goods produced by child soldiers from
legitimately traded goods (such as, for example, by adopting
the UCR and CSI mechanisms in customs enforcement), a ban
would certainly have a "restrictive impact on international
commerce."204 Finally, it cannot be said that a ban causes un-
reasonable "restrictions on the right to import," since goods
produced or distributed by child soldiers, by nature, fall
outside the scope of permitted imports due to states' obliga-
tions to enforce international prohibitions against child sol-
diering. This is an entirely different situation from the qualita-
tive restrictions on publications and audiovisual goods at issue
in the China-Publications case, which did not involve goods for
which there were comparable international restrictions or
prohibitions. On its face, therefore, and without probing a
state's particular system design for a ban on goods produced
by child soldiers, GATT article XX(a) could justify a state-im-
posed ban.
ii. The "Customs Enforcement" Exception in Article XX(d)
States can argue that the ban is meant to effectuate their
international obligations to prevent child soldiering,20 which
are either directly incorporated in their respective legal sys-
tems, or transformed through legislative enactment or stat-
ute.206 Assuming that their respective constitutional or statu-
tory procedures have been observed, states will presumably en-
act or implement customs laws or regulations to implement
the ban on the relevant goods. Thus the ban could be justified
under article XX(d), being "necessary to secure compliance
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the
204. I discuss the potential policy problems in relation to identification
and attribution in Part IV, infra, and show why the WTO dispute settlement
framework is the better venue for resolving controversies on identification
and attribution.
205. See infra text accompanying note 215.
206. For a comprehensive compilation of the constitutional methods by
which states incorporate or transform international legal obligations into
their respective legal systems, see generally LAMBERTUs ERADES, INTERAC-
TIONs BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAw: A COMPARATIVE CASE
LAW STUDY (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Cees Flinterman eds., 1993).
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provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to cus-
toms enforcement ....... "
The Appellate Body also laid out a two-tiered test for ap-
plying article XX(d) in Korea-Various Measures on Beef 207
First, the measure must be one designed to 'secure
compliance' with laws or regulations that are not
themselves inconsistent with some provision of the
GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be 'neces-
sary' to secure such compliance. A Member who in-
vokes Article XX(d) as ajustification has the burden
of demonstrating that these two requirements are
met.208
A state-imposed ban on goods produced by child soldiers
could also meet both aspects of the interpretive test for article
XX (d).
First, a ban secures compliance with international
prohibitions against child soldiering, as well as treaty-defined
preventive duties under the Optional Protocol to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child involving children and armed
conflict and ILO Convention No. 182.209 The domestic legal
effect lent to these international prohibitions (whether
through direct incorporation or transformation through legis-
lative enactment) supplies the customs enforcement "law or
regulation" subject of GATT article XX(d). A bare textual ex-
amination of these prohibitions and duties shows that none of
them are facially inconsistent with GATT 1994. Accordingly, if
these international prohibitions and duties form part of the
domestic law of a WATO member, they could be subsumed
within the scope of "laws and regulations" in article XX(d). In
Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks,210 the Appellate Body carefully
noted that international agreements ipso facto do not fall
within "laws and regulations" in article XX(d), unless the rules
within such agreements are found within the domestic legal
207. Korea-Beef AB Report supra note 191, 1 157; see also LESTER ET AL.,
supra note 51, at 396-400 (discussing jurisprudence regarding article
XX(d)).
208. Id.
209. Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child, supra note 19, art. 4;
ILO Convention No. 182, supra note 29, art. 6-7.
210. Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, It 68-71, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Mexico-
Taxes on Soft Drinks AB Report].
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system of a WTO member. Matters relating to "customs en-
forcement" would "generally involve rights and obligations
that apply to importers or exporters."211 Where a state has in-
corporated the international prohibitions or preventive duties
in relation to child soldiering as part of domestic law, there-
fore, it can rightfully invoke a state ban on goods produced or
distributed by child soldiers as part of "customs enforcement"
or "laws and regulations" within the meaning of article
XX(d). 212 Being customs enforcement laws and regulations,
such laws and regulations "are by legislative fiat GATT consis-
tent."213 A ban would "secure compliance" as understood in
article XX(d), because it "enforces compliance" 214 with such
domestically incorporated norms (whether contained in cus-
toms laws or regulations) on child soldiering.
Second, a ban is clearly "necessary" to secure compliance
with "laws and regulations" or "customs enforcement" matters
in relation to child soldiers. The Panel Report in US-Section
337 adopted a similar balancing test for "necessity" as had
been set by the Appellate Body in US-Gambling:
It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party can-
notjustify a measure inconsistent with another GATT
provision as 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d) if
an alternative measure which it could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent
211. Id. 70.
212. To fall within the purview of "securing compliance" as understood in
GATT article XX(d), the ban should directly enforce the customs law or
regulation that prohibits the entry of goods produced by child soldiers, and
it should not merely seek to "attain the objectives" of such laws or regula-
tions. Report by the Panel, EEC-Regulation of Imports ofParts and Components,
11 5.17-.18, L/6657 (Mar. 22, 1990), GATT B.S.I.D. (37th Supp.) at 132
(1990); see also Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Containing Periodicals,
5.9, WT/DS31/R (Mar 14, 1997) (rejecting Canada's argument against
following the interpretation advanced by the panel in EEC-Regulation of Im-
ports of Parts and Components).
213. MAVROIDIs, TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 182, at 264 ("GATT Art.
XX(d) covers measures which aim to secure compliance with laws (or regu-
lations) which are GATT consistent. It does not define what a GATT consis-
tent law (or regulation) is in an exhaustive manner. It does, however, pro-
vide an indicative list to this effect: customs enforcement, enforcement of
monopolies, protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and preven-
tion of deceptive practices. Such laws (and regulations) are by legislative fiat
GATT consistent." (emphasis in original)).
214. Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks AB Report, supra note 210, 73.
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with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the
same token, in cases where a measure consistent with
other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a
contracting party is bound to use, among the mea-
sures reasonably available to it, that which entails the
least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.
The Panel wished to make it clear that this does not
mean that a contracting party could be asked to
change its substantive patent law or its desired level
of enforcement of that law, provided that such law
and such level of enforcement are the same for im-
ported and domestically-produced products. How-
ever, it does mean that, if a contracting party could rea-
sonably secure that level of enforcement in a manner that is
not inconsistent with other GAT provisions, it would be
required to do so. 215
Arguably, a ban is a reasonably available measure to a
state to enforce its laws, regulations, and customs enforcement
rules in relation to child soldiers. Assuming that a state has
been able to determine the provenance of the goods in ques-
tion, the ban is "least inconsistent" with GATT provisions, be-
cause GATT norms (such as the substantive prohibitions
against qualitative restrictions and the principles of non-dis-
crimination and MFN) pertain to legitimately traded goods in
the international stream of commerce. In contrast, goods pro-
duced by child soldiers could never be treated as legitimate
subjects of international commerce. The measure that would
achieve the objective of customs enforcement against such ille-
gal goods or commodities (even if they appear to be facially-
licit goods, such as minerals, oil, timber, and other natural re-
sources) is nothing less than an outright ban or import prohi-
bition. 216 Taking the plethora of international treaty prohibi-
tions against child soldiering and international duties to pre-
215. Report of the Panel, United States-Section 337 of the TaiffAct of 1930, 1[
5.26, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), GATT B.S.I.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1989) (em-
phasis added).
216. Mere taxation of such goods would not be a "reasonably available
alternative measure."' See EG-Asbestos AB Report 1 174 ("In our view, France
could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative measure if that
measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the Decree seeks
to 'halt.' Such an alternative measure would, in effect, prevent France from
achieving its chosen level of health protection . . .").
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vent child soldiering,217 alongside Security Council resolutions
that mandate states to take measures against the illicit trade
and exploitation of natural resources, 218 a state-imposed ban
on goods produced with the labor of child soldiers squarely
meets the threshold necessity test as a "reasonably available
measure" that is "least inconsistent with GATT 1994."219
States can also draw some comparative insight from an-
other case, EC-Taiff Preferences,220 where the European Com-
munities (EC) sought to defend measures to combat illegal
drug production and trafficking. After considering the ex-
press provisions of the Council Regulation and implementing
measures, as well as the design, architecture, and structure of
the measures, the Panel rejected the EC's asserted defence
under GATT article XX(b) (the specific exception for mea-
sures necessary to protect "human life . . . or health"). In
reaching its conclusions, the Panel identified several defects:
(1) the Drug Arrangements did not contain any textual refer-
ence to the supposed objective of protecting human life or
health;221 (2) it was uncertain how its tariff preference scheme
would contribute to the realization of the EC's averred health
objectives, especially considering the decreasing trend of ben-
217. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
219. Note that the U.S.-Gambling AB Report, supra note 194, 11 304-11
provides guidance on the allocation of evidentiary burdens with respect to a
"reasonably available measure." The Appellate Body held that the respon-
dent state does not have to "identify the universe of less trade-restrictive al-
ternative measures and then show that none of those measures achieves the
desired objective." Id. at T 309. The respondent state may also "point out
why alternative measures would not achieve the same objectives as the chal-
lenged measure, but it is under no obligation to do so in order to establish,
in the first instance, that its measure is 'necessary."' Id. at 1 310. The re-
spondent state only has to "make a prima facie case that its measure is 'neces-
sary' by putting forward evidence and arguments that enable a panel to as-
sess the challenged measure, in light of the relevant factors to be 'weighed
and balanced' in a given case." Id. at 1 307. It is only when a complainant
raises a possible WTO-consistent alternative measure that the respondent
state "will be required to demonstrate why its challenged measure neverthe-
less remains 'necessary' in the light of that alternative." Id. at I 311.
220. Panel Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, 17 7.200-.223, WT/DS246/R, (Dec. 1,
2003).
221. Id. 7.201.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
2011] 401
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
efits from the Generalized System of Preferences;222 (3) the
Drug Arrangements did not contain any monitoring mecha-
nism to ascertain the effectiveness of the measure for protect-
ing human life or health in the EC;2 23 and (4) there were less-
restrictive alternatives to accomplish the EC's claimed objec-
tive, such as financial and technical assistance combined with
multilaterally negotiated tariff reductions that provided suffi-
cient tariff reductions on products of export interest to drug-
affected countries. 224 Admittedly, this case involved tariff pref-
erences, and not the kind of import prohibitions considered
in this Article. However, the factual lens used in EC-TariffPref-
erences is worth considering, since the "necessity" of a measure
justified under a GATT article XX exception was scrutinized
based on the text, structure, design, and architecture of the
regulation in relation to the policy objective. Applying in-
sights from EC-Tariff Preferences, therefore, a state designing a
customs law or regulation to ban the import of goods pro-
duced by child soldiers must make sure that such law or regu-
lation states its objective; clearly shows and affirms the contri-
bution of the ban to the achievement of the objective; and
(possibly) provides a monitoring or evaluation mechanism to
assess the efficacy of the law in implementing the ban. Finally,
there must not be any "reasonably available alternative" to the
ban.
iii. The Chapeau of GAT Article XX
As the previous analyses have shown, a state-imposed ban
on goods produced by child soldiers meets the first tier for
applying GATT article XX laid down in US-Gasoline, since the
measure could be "provisionally justified under specific excep-
tions," as in articles XX(a) and XX(d). The second tier for
applying GATT article XX requires that a measure comply
with the requirements of the chapeau to GATT article XX
("the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjus-
tifiable discrimination between countries where the same con-
ditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade"). In essence, the chapeau provides a good faith stan-
222. Id. I 7.213.
223. Id. 7.202.
224. Id. 1 7.220.
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dard that aids in assessing the application of a measure invoked
under one of the specific exceptions in GATT article XX, and
thereby prevents a state from abusing its right to invoke these
exceptions:225
The focus of the chapeau, by its express terms, is on
the application of a measure already found to be in-
consistent with an obligation of the GATT 1994 but
falling within one of the paragraphs of article XX.
The chapeau's requirements are twofold. First, a
measure provisionally justified under one of the
paragraphs of article XX must not be applied in a
manner that would constitute 'arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination' between countries where the
same conditions prevail. Secondly, this measure
must not be applied in a manner that would consti-
tute 'a disguised restriction on international trade.'
Through these requirements, the chapeau serves to
ensure that members' rights to avail themselves of ex-
ceptions are exercised in good faith to protect inter-
ests considered legitimate under Article XX, not as a
means to circumvent one Member's obligations to-
wards other WTO Members.
The foregoing requirements in the chapeau should be
built into the regulatory design of any ban. To ensure that a
ban would not be deemed a measure that results in arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination, or operates as a disguised re-
striction on international trade, a state must have a system that
enables it to make reliable factual verifications on the source
of such goods. As a matter of fairness, it must also enable pri-
vate parties to contest such factual conclusions on the source
of such goods under pre-established procedures that guaran-
tee transparency, notice, and hearing. These regulatory con-
siderations are not novel departures from existing customs
practices throughout the world on determining non-preferen-
tial rules of origin in relation to quantitative restrictions and
origin labelling. 226 So long as a state can show that it has im-
225. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Re-
treaded Tyres, 1 215, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
226. For a useful comparison of rules of origin across jurisdictions, see
generally EDWIN VERMULSr, PAUL WAER, & JACQUES BOURGEOIS, RuLEs OF OR-
IGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1994).
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partially undertaken its customs investigation to determine the
origin of such goods, there should be little difficulty comply-
ing with the good faith requirements of the chapeau in GATT
article XX.
b. Security Exception: Article XXI(b) (ii)
GATT article XXI has been described as "an all-embrac-
ing exception to GATT obligations.... Once a WTO Member
relies on Article XXI to implement a measure against another
Member, there is no GATT obligation to which the sanction-
ing Member must adhere with respect to the target Mem-
ber."227
Unlike GATT article XX, the Security Exceptions under
GATT article XXI do not contain a chapeau. While the word-
ing of GATT article XXI(b) (ii)228 appears to afford latitude
towards a state's discretionary determination of what com-
prises its "essential security interests,"2 2 9 it also does not ap-
pear to preclude the possibility of judicial review under the
WTO dispute settlement system.230 There has been no panel
report adopted thus far on GATT article XXI,231 and as of this
writing it has scarcely been invoked.
227. BHALA, supra note 172, at 557.
228. "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed ... to prevent any
[Member] from taking any action which it considers necessary for the pro-
tection of its essential security interests ... relating to the traffic in arms,
ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military establishment."
229. BHALA, supfa note 172, at 558 ("The word 'it' means sole discretion to
determine whether an action conforms to the requirements set forth in Arti-
cle XXI(b) rests with the WTO Member invoking sanction measures."). But
see Andrew Emmerson, Conceptualizing Security Exceptions: Legal Doctrine or Po-
litical Excuse?, II J. INT'L ECON. L. 135 (Feb. 2008) (arguing against the self-
judging nature of GATT article XXI).
230. See Rene Browne, Note, Revisiting "National Security" in an Interdepen-
dent World: The GA TT Article XXI Defense After Helms-Burton, 86 GEo. L.J. 405,
412 (1997) (arguing that the WTO Charter removes the formerly available
option of opting out of judicial review by citing "essential security); Peter
Lindsay, Note, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XX Subtle Success or Rampant
Failure?, 52 DuKE L.J. 1277, 1287-1296 (2003).
231. Nicaragua did invoke GATT article XXI when the United States im-
posed a two-way embargo in the 1980s. However, the subsequent panel re-
port, United States - Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua , L/6053 (Oct. 13,
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
404 [Vol. 43:337
LEVERAGING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS
Anthony Cassimatis observes that GATT article XXI "is
rarely relied upon. When it has been, it has usually been in
cases of serious disruptions in international relations. In such
serious cases Article XXI appears available to justify trade mea-
sures designed to protect human rights. The limited disci-
pline imposed by Article XXI enhances its potential human
rights application. "2 3 2 However, this interpretation can be
contested, since the few instances where states invoked GATT
article XXI never reached an adjudicated conclusion.233
In the absence of jurisprudential guidance on the scope
of GATT article XX(b) (ii), I submit that a textual interpreta-
tion of this provision, according to its ordinary meaning, could
accommodate a state-imposed ban on goods produced by
child soldiers. GATT article XX(b) (ii) entitles a member to
take action necessary for the protection of its essential security
in interests "relating to ... such traffic in other goods and materials
as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a
military establishment." As with their trade in prohibited sub-
stances and goods (such as arms, narcotics and other illegal
drugs), armed groups' trade in goods produced by child
soldiers are undertaken to finance their military operations in
hostilities. A state could thus be well-justified in barring the
entry of such goods that finance the prosecution and conduct
of armed conflicts. Contributing to the financing of armed
groups through the trade of such goods can threaten the se-
curity interests of a state by making the state indirectly supply a
military establishment. These justifications should apply with
greater force where states are internationally obligated to take
all necessary measures to prevent the "worst forms of child la-
bor," such as child soldiering and child labor in the illegal and
hazardous exploitation of natural resources. A state can rea-
1986), was never adopted. MAVROIDIS, GATT COMMENTARY, supra note 183,
at 215; see also LESTER ET AL., supra note 51.
232. ANTHONY E. CAssIMATis, HUMAN RIGHTS TRADE RELATED MEASURES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE LEGALITY OF TRADE MEASURES IMPOSED IN
RESPONSE TO VIolATIONs OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS UNDER GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAw 334 (2007).
233. See Alan S. Alexandroff & Rajeev Sharma, The National Security Provi-
sion - GA7T Article XXI, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, Eco-
NOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIs 1571, 1572-78 (Patrick F. J. Macrory et al.
eds., 2005) (discussing instances in which parties have invoked Article XXI);
MAVROIDIs, TRADE IN GOODS, supra note 182, at 322-31.
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sonably argue that its essential security interests reasonably ne-
cessitate its exercise of control over such trade flows into the
state's territory, which ultimately redound to the benefit of
armed groups engaged in internal or international armed con-
flicts.
2. A KPCS-like Certification System Applicable at Customs
Inspection
States can also opt to implement a KPCS-like certification
system as part of customs inspection procedures, where all for-
eign and local companies trading in facially licit goods or com-
modities are made to certify, to the best of their knowledge,
that such goods or commodities were not produced or distrib-
uted by child soldiers. The certification mechanism need not
be universally applied to all facially licit products, goods, or
commodities, but instead limited to such types of goods or
commodities that the U.N. Security Council has already identi-
fied to be the subject of armed groups' conflict trade.234 Thus,
states could require all foreign and local companies trading in
diamonds and other minerals, timber, oil, and other such nat-
ural resources traded in armed conflicts, to certify that such
goods or commodities were not produced or distributed by
child soldiers. Where a company (foreign or local) cannot
make such a certification, a state would then be justified in
barring the entry of such goods into its territory.
On its face, a certification system imposed as part of the
customs processes can also be regarded as a form of quantita-
tive restriction. As with an import ban discussed in the previ-
ous subsection, such a certification system would likewise be
susceptible to challenge under GATT article 1:1 (the most
favoured nation/MFN clause), GATT article XI:1 (the core
prohibition on quantitative restrictions), GATT article XIII:1
(non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restric-
tions), and GATT article X:3(a) (requiring uniform, impartial,
and reasonable administration of laws and regulations as de-
fined in GATT article X:1). A state which requires such certifi-
cations from foreign and local companies for suspected con-
flict commodities can be charged with violating the MFN
clause by discriminating against some states, or conversely, ac-
234. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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cording preferential treatment towards other states. The certi-
fication is a restriction which is not a duty, tax, or similar
charge, and as such could be a prohibited quantitative restric-
tion. Finally, even if such certification could be held as a per-
missible quantitative restriction, it could still be held as a
GATT non-conforming measure if the state discriminates or
acts arbitrarily in its administration of the certification system.
Since the certification system, like the ban discussed in
the previous subsection, also partakes of a customs measure, I
am of the view that a state can marshal similar arguments
based on GATT article XX(a) (the "public morals" exception),
article XX(d) (the "customs enforcement" exception), and
GATT article XXI(b) (ii) (security exception involving a state's
essential security interests that are implicated by measures that
relate directly or indirectly to supplying a military establish-
ment) as discussed in the previous subsection. The ban only
differs factually from this certification system insofar as the
identifiability of child soldier-produced goods is concerned. In
the previous subsection, the identity of such goods is already
well-established at the border, whether through the state's use
of UCR or CSI technologies combined with information on
reported conflict commodities from the U.N. Security Council
and U.N. experts' panels. On the other hand, in this pro-
posed certification system, the state is uncertain about the ori-
gins of goods, and must rely on importing or exporting com-
panies' certifications attesting that goods were not produced
or distributed by child soldiers.
In designing the full contours of such a certification sys-
tem, however, states must also be mindful of current WTO ju-
risprudence that had involved customs regulations similar to
certification systems. Some examples might suffice here. In de-
vising customs regulations dependent on certification, states
should consider US - Shrimp,2 3 5 where a WTO Panel held that
the United States violated article XI:1 236 when it required all
shipments of shrimp and shrimp products to be accompanied
by a declaration or certification "attesting that the product
"has been harvested 'either under conditions that do not ad-
versely affect sea turtles ... or in waters subject to the jurisdic-
235. Panel Report, US-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Prod-
ucts, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998).
236. Id. at 1 162.
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tion of a nation currently certified pursuant to section 609."237
The Panel found that, notwithstanding the United States' ad-
mission of its violation of article XI:1, a textual examination of
the challenged certification measure revealed the same to be a
"prohibition or restriction" under article XI:1. (Upon resolv-
ing this issue, the Panel no longer addressed other challenges
based on articles 1:1 and XIII:1.) For states considering im-
port licensing measures, they should also note how a non-auto-
matic import licensing system (implemented to protect a bal-
ance of payments situation) was deemed a prohibited import
restriction under article XI:1 in India-Quantitative Restric-
tions.238 States that permit private parties or trade associations
to participate in the enforcement of customs regulations for
goods produced or distributed by child soldiers should also
examine Argentina - Hides and Leather. In this case, the Panel
held that Argentina administered its regulation (providing for
the participation of representatives of a domestic tanners' as-
sociation in customs inspection procedures) in a process that
"inherently contains the possibility of revealing confidential
business information ... [as] an unreasonable manner of ad-
ministering the laws, regulations and rules identified in Article
X:1 and therefore inconsistent with Article X:3(a)." 2 3 9
3. Non-fiscal Measures that Apply After Goods and Commodities
Have Cleared Customs
Finally, a state might consider notjust restricting the entry
of goods produced or distributed by child soldiers, but also
imposing due diligence or reportorial requirements on for-
eign and local companies operating within its territory, to ver-
ify that their supply chains do not include such goods. These
are post-customs clearance non-fiscal measures, which would
affect the internal sale or distribution of such goods within the
state's territory. As such, the GATT prohibition that would be
facially infringed by these types of measures would be GATT
article III:4 (Regulatory Measures and National Treatment),
which states in full:
237. Id. at 1 21.
238. Panel Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile, and Industrial Products, 5.129, WT/DS90/R (Sept. 22, 1999).
239. Panel Report, Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides
and the Import of Finished Leather, 11.94, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000).
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The products of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect of all laws, regulations, and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use. The
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the ap-
plication of differential internal transportation
charges which are based exclusively on the economic
operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product. 240
This provision refers to a state's imposition of measures
within its territory that would alter the conditions of competi-
tion between domestic goods and imported goods.241 Where
such measures go "beyond the obligation to indicate the coun-
try of origin, [they] would violate Article 111:4, unless the same
measure also applied to domestic producers of a like prod-
uct."2 4 2 This position, however, has been clarified by the Ap-
pellate Body in Korea-Beef where instead of the view that "[a] ny
regulatory distinction that is based exclusively on criteria relat-
ing to the nationality or the origin of the products is incompat-
ible with Article III,"243 the Appellate Body affirmed that
"[a]ccording 'treatment no less favourable' means ... accord-
ing to conditions of competition no less favourable to the im-
ported product than to the like domestic product."244 Based
on this clarification, " [a] formal difference in treatment be-
tween imported and like domestic products is thus neither
necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of Art. 111:4.
Whether or not imported products are treated 'less favourably'
than like domestic products should be assessed instead by ex-
amining whether a measure modifies the conditions of competi-
240. GATT, supra note 172, art. 11:4.
241. Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural
Machinery, 1 12, L/833 (July 15, 1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, 64
(1959).
242. BHAiA, supra note 172, at 137.
243. Korea-Beef AB Report at 1 138.
244. Id. at 135.
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tion in the relevant market to the detriment of imported prod-
ucts."245
Applying the foregoing principles, a state imposing repor-
torial or due diligence requirements on companies operating
within its territory to verify that their supply chains do not in-
clude goods produced by child soldiers could be vulnerable to
a GATT article 111:4 challenge if such requirements indeed al-
ter the conditions of competition to the detriment of im-
ported products, or conversely, to the unwarranted benefit of
domestic products. However, it is not altogether clear if condi-
tions of competition would indeed be adversely affected if the
reportorial and due diligence requirements were extended to
both foreign and local companies producing or distributing
such facially licit goods and commodities in a state's territory.
This conclusion would require more extensive empirical analy-
sis that, considering space constraints, I will not attempt in this
Article.
Assuming arguendo, therefore, that a state provisionally
breaches GATT article I:4 when imposing such post-customs
reportorial and due diligence requirements, can it avail of any
defences under GATT article XX (General Exceptions) and
GATT article XXI (Security Exceptions)? 246 I submit that the
"public morals" exception in GATT article XX(a) and the "es-
sential security interests" exception in GATT article XXI(b) (ii)
could be invoked as possible defences. Similar to the previous
discussions on customs bans and customs certification systems,
states would have to show that imposing post-customs reporto-
rial and due diligence requirements to verify supply chains sat-
isfy the specific exception (e.g. measures "necessary to protect
public morals"). Likewise, the state must meet the chapeau
requirements of GATT article XX, showing that the reporto-
rial and due diligence requirements do not amount to "arbi-
trary discrimination," "unjustifiable discrimination," or a "dis-
guised restriction on international trade."247 Finally, in order
to avail of the "essential security interests" exception in GATT
245. Id. at 1 137. The Appellate Body made a similar observation in an
obiter dictum in EC-Asbestos AB Report 1 100 (emphasis in original).
246. Note that there is some subsisting doctrinal confusion on the rela-
tionship between the non-discrimination aspects in the chapeau of GATT
article XX and the non-discrimination requirements in GATT article III. See
LESTER ET AL., supra note 51, at 320, 387-388.
247. See U.S.-Gasoline AB Report at 22-29.
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article XXI(b) (ii), the state must show that the reportorial and
due diligence requirements are indeed designed to prevent
"indirectly . . supplying a military establishment."
Undoubtedly, there will be numerous legal and policy nu-
ances to be considered in designing measures to stop the flow
of goods produced by child soldiers. The measures I have de-
scribed here only present general sketches of such measures,
and only for purposes of showing how these measures could
still be GATT-compliant or WTO-consistent. This Part has
shown that there are a variety of quantitatively restrictive regu-
latory measures that states can unilaterally adopt to prevent
the flow of such goods into their respective territories. While
international cooperation against this form of trade should
ideally be undertaken on the same scale as the international
regulatory framework against prohibited substances, states
should not be dissuaded from harnessing domestic mecha-
nisms, and exercising their respective customs enforcement
powers, to ensure that they fulfill their international obliga-
tions to prevent child soldiering. States can use GATT articles
XX(a), XX(d), and XXI(b) (ii) to justify these domestic re-
straints on trade. Nevertheless, states might have to consider
some policy aspects in designing bans and quantitative restric-
tions. Part IV responds to these aspects alongside the interna-
tional methods states have pursued to vindicate their interna-
tional responsibility to stop and prevent child soldiering.
Lastly, I examine a pending bill in the United States House of
Representatives (H.R. 4128, otherwise known as the "Conflict
Minerals Trade Act"), as a possible GATT-compliant design
paradigm.
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND FUTURE
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
On August 4, 2009, the U.N. Security Council unani-
mously passed Resolution 1882,248 which reaffirmed previous
Council resolutions249 involving the protection of children in
248. S.C. Res. 1882, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1882 (Aug. 4, 2009).
249. Id. pmbl. 1. Previous resolutions are canvassed supra in note 32. See
also Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/
2006/33 (July 24, 2006); Statement by the President of the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/48 (Nov. 28, 2006); Statement by the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/6 (Feb. 12, 2008); Statement
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armed conflict, while emphasizing the primary role of national
governments in providing protection and relief to all children
affected by armed conflicts. Resolution 1882 summarizes cur-
rent international methods to stop child soldiering:
(1) public condemnation (or "naming and sham-
ing") ;250
(2) fact-finding, 251 reporting,252 monitoring,253 and
information exchange;254
(3) incorporating child protection concerns in U.N.
peacekeeping missions; 255
(4) post-conflict demobilization of child soldiers and
facilitating their transition and reintegration into
their respective civil communities; 256
(5) criminal prosecution of individuals that commit
the international crime of child soldier enlistment;257
and
(6) calling for implementation of individual states'
time-bound action plans to halt the recruitment and
use of children in armed conflict situations. 258
Resolution 1882 shows that international efforts to stop
child soldiering are marshalled under a complex web of inter-
national legal prohibitions and formal treaty instruments; the
case-to-case involvement of the U.N. Security Council in partic-
ular situations of armed conflict; and an array of fact-finding
and monitoring functions simultaneously discharged by U.N.
agencies such as the Office of the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Apart
from these latter agencies, there are also numerous interna-
tional NGOs that comprise a robust international civil society
independently investigating, monitoring, and reporting on the
by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2008/28 (July 17, 2008);
Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2009/9 (Apr.
29, 2009).
250. S.C. Res. 1882, supra note 248, 1 1.
251. Id. 1 9, 10.
252. Id. 3, 8, 17, 19.
253. Id. 2.
254. Id. 4.
255. Id. It 11-12.
256. Id. 1 13-15.
257. Id. 1 16.
258. Id. 5.
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incidence and continuing proliferation of child soldiering.
Most prominent of these are the Coalition to Stop Child
Soldiers, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Global
March Against Child Labour, Soldier Child International,
among others.
The Security Council's directive to all states to submit and
report on their time-bound anti-child-soldiering action plans
sends a strong message that the prevention of child soldiering
is also a matter of state responsibility. While the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court clearly manifests the inter-
national community's agreement to treat child enlistment as a
matter for individual criminal responsibility, prevention
should also be seen from the prism of state responsibility in
light of the express obligations to this end in both the Op-
tional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Child in-
volving Children and Armed Conflict and ILO Convention
No. 182. States' international responsibility to prevent child
soldiering puts into question their use of domestic and territo-
rial powers, not just to formally prohibit and criminalize child
soldier enlistment, but more importantly, to respond to condi-
tions that have enabled armed groups-whether state or non-
state-to exploit and conscript children into this worst form of
child labor in military hostilities. If the Security Council's anti-
impunity terminology in Resolution 1882 is any indication, it is
that states have a duty to devise their own ex ante strategies to
prevent child soldiering from arising in the first place within
their borders.
This preventive duty in relation to child soldiering can
also be situated within the broader consensus of states on an
international "responsibility to protect" (RtoP). While RtoP
doctrine has been often critically parsed in relation to one of
its aspects on the use of force,259 its less controversial terminol-
ogy in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document empha-
sizes the notion of states' individual and collective responsibili-
ties to prevent war crimes and other serious violations of
human rights. 2 60 If the unanimous endorsement of the U.N.
259. See generally Nicholas J. Wheeler, Operationalising the Responsibility to
Protect: The Continuing Debate over Where Authority Should be Located for the Use of
Force, 3 NUPI REP. (2008).
260. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138-39, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60.1 (Sept. 16, 2005) (describing the responsibilities of states and
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General Assembly of RtoP doctrine is any indication, it is rea-
sonable to infer that states have reconceptualised how they
view their own international obligations towards more encom-
passing and firm commitments to prevent war crimes and
other serious violations of human rights within their jurisdic-
tion. Within this contemporary global consensus, it is not at
all far-fetched to examine states' international obligations to
prevent child soldiering as part of the corpus of state responsi-
bility. It is on this understanding of state responsibility that I
propose states use the norms of international economic law
available to them, and domestically implement bans or quanti-
tative restrictions against goods produced by child soldiers,
pending institutional modes of cooperation similar to the in-
ternational anti-drug-trafficking system.
Certainly, unilateral bans will not be without its attendant
policy complications. For one, we can anticipate that most
states will have the primary difficulty of identifying and attrib-
uting goods as originating from the labor of child soldiers serv-
ing in armed groups. If a state cannot show that it has justifia-
ble reasons for segregating such goods from the legitimate
trade of facially licit goods and commodities, it will encounter
opposition and likely retaliation from other states within the
trading system. The state in question will likely be burdened
to respond before the WTO, incurring both logistical and le-
gal costs in defending its trade-restrictive measure. In this
sense, the entire strategy of using international economic legal
norms to confront child soldiering is also contingent on the
state's possession of information as well as its political will and
capacity for vigorous customs enforcement. As I attempted to
show in Part II, however, the task of identifying and tracking
such goods is not altogether Herculean. There is already a
viable roster of technologies (such as the UCR and CSI sys-
tems) and mechanisms (such as legislation on corporate con-
duct, a certification system, financial auditing, among others)
that states can consider in designing their customs restrictions
against goods produced by child soldiers. These technologies
and mechanisms are no more invasive or costly than what
the international community to prevent against genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity through appropriate and necessary
means).
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states already implement for anti-terrorism customs inspection
and enforcement.
A late 2009 legislative proposal at the United States House
of Representatives, H.R. 4128, otherwise known as the "Con-
flict Minerals Trade Act,"26 1 appears to be a promising model
of WTO-consistent legislation. Introduced by Democrat Rep-
resentative James McDermott, the bill seeks to "improve trans-
parency and reduce trade in conflict minerals." 262 The bill
recognizes the "use of child soldiers on the front lines, as
bonded labor, and as sex slaves," 263 and acknowledges U.N.
reports as well as Security Council resolution 1857, which:
(A) broadens existing sanctions relating to the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo to include "individuals
or entities supporting the armed groups . . . . . .
through illicit trade of natural resources;" and
(B) encourages member countries to ensure that
companies handling minerals from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo exercise due diligence on
their suppliers, including-
(i) determining the precise identity of the depos-
its from which the minerals they intend to
purchase have been mined;
(ii) establishing whether or not these deposits
are controlled or taxed by armed groups; and
(iii) refusing to buy minerals known to originate,
or suspected to originate, from deposits con-
trolled or taxed by armed groups.264
H.R. 4128 calls for the creation of a "Congo Conflict Min-
erals Map" in consultation with the U.N. Group of Experts on
the Democratic Republic of Congo, other U.N. members, as
well as international NGOs, in order to identify armed groups'
conflict zone mining operations,265 and also provides for gui-
dance for commercial entities in order to exercise due dili-
gence, "including documentation on the origin and chain of
custody for their products, on their suppliers to ensure that
conflict minerals used in their products do not-
261. Conflict Minerals Trade Act, H.R. 4128, 111th Cong. (2009).
262. Id. at pmbl.
263. Id. § 2(5).
264. Id. §§ 2(7)-(8).
265. Id. § 4(a).
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(A) directly finance armed conflict;
(B) result in labor or human rights violations; or
(C) damage the environment."26 6
H.R. 4128 relies on various international reports from the
U.N. Security Council, U.N. specialized agencies, and the work
of international organizations to enable the U.S. Government
to draw up a "Potential Conflict Goods List,"2 67 and also sets
customs declaration requirements to certify that goods are
"conflict minerals free," with corresponding criminal penalties
for non-compliance. 268
As seen from the example of H.R. 4128, states might have
less reason to be apprehensive about information asymmetry
when they unilaterally ban goods produced by child soldiers.
The mass of publicly available reports from the U.N. Security
Council, the U.N. specialized agencies, and international
NGOs in the past decade regularly identify states that have re-
ported incidences of child soldiering. States can build their
own information databases from these regular reports, gener-
ating their own domestic indicators for "suspect" imports or
exports. States may also consider concluding their own bilat-
eral or regional agreements to guarantee information sharing
to help track the flow of such goods and commodities across
adjacent borders and territories.
Second, states would also have to consider private reme-
dial procedures when they design bans or restrictions. What
optimal administrative procedure will ensure that private par-
ties have recourse and access to due process in challenging a
state's characterization of goods as having originated from the
labor or participation of child soldiers, without sacrificing the
demands of expediency in preventing the flow of such goods
into a state's territory? Could other factual indicators such as
documentary receipts, company registrations, banking and fi-
nancial information, be used to corroborate or bolster a state's
factual determination that such goods are illicitly traded by
private parties acting as intermediaries for armed groups?
While I have laid emphasis in Part II on customs mechanisms
and procedures that might be used to track conflict goods and
commodities, we should also not lose sight of a host of interna-
266. Id. § 4(b).
267. Id. § 6.
268. Id. §§ 7-9.
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tional financial regulatory initiatives that enable states to trace
proceeds from illicit activities, such as those implemented and
supervised by the Financial Action Task Force,269 the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Group of
Bank Supervisors, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, and the Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors,
among others. 270 All of these initiatives could be considered
in complementing a state's chosen administrative procedural
design for implementing its ban on goods produced by child
soldiers.
Finally, a state that proactively uses international eco-
nomic law norms to implement a ban on such goods must also
be prepared to deal with both its internal constituencies as
well as disgruntled states disputing the ban. An outright ban
on trade in goods will inevitably impact domestic producers
(who rely on such goods as intermediate inputs for their fin-
ished goods) or end-consumers. The state in question must be
able to convince and persuade disaffected groups at home and
abroad that the restrictions on the flow of goods are indeed
factually and legally justified in light of the state's interna-
tional responsibility to prevent child soldiering. This can only
be done if the state has a well-designed process for informa-
tion verification and rules of origin for goods. Otherwise, the
costly political fallout from selective, arbitrary, or unjustified
bans and quantitative restrictions will likely cause the state's
decision-makers to abandon the strategy altogether, causing it
to relapse into the inertia of awaiting international consensus
to address this pressing problem.
269. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (last visited
Jan. 20, 2010) ("The task force is an inter-governmental body whose purpose
is to create and oversee policies to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing on both national and international levels.").
270. Winer, supra note 134, at 75; see also Phil Williams and John T. Pi-
carelli, Combating Organized Crime in Armed Conflict, in PROFITING FROM PEACE:
MANAGING THE RESOURCE DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL WAR, supra note 108, at 123
(outlining policy recommendations to address various organized criminal
activities that both fuel and/or profit from armed conflict); Cynthia McClin-
tock, The Evolution of Internal War in Peru: The Conjunction of Need, Creed, and
Organizational Finance, in RETHINKING THE EcoNoMics OF WAR: THE INTER-
SECTION OF NEED, CREED, AND GREED, supra note 133, at 52 (examining the
factors that contributed to the rise and fall of the Communist Party of Peru,
known as the "Shining Path").
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V. CONCLUSION
Child soldiers will not vanish overnight. For as long as
incentives exist for armed groups to enlist children for these
worst forms of child labor, no amount of legal formalization of
prohibitions or rhetorical advocacy can eradicate the phenom-
enon of child soldiering. From pre-modern warfare to
postmodern armed conflicts, the inherent advantages of chil-
dren as logistical, support, or direct members of military units
have rendered them vulnerable to exploitation to serve the
ends of military necessity.271 Their attractiveness to armed
groups fighting protracted insurgencies, armed conflicts, or
engaging in terrorist acts, has only increased in recent years
with the proliferation of small-scale arms and incendiary weap-
ons, and the expansion of armed groups' illicit trade in goods
and commodities to finance their operations.
My proposal of state-imposed unilateral bans on certain
goods aims to address a hitherto-unexplored area of disincen-
tives. Scholars and policy analysts alike have multiple descrip-
tive perspectives on the psychological, economic, and political
root causes of child soldiering, 272 and few truly concretize the
economic framework that undergirds this pernicious practice.
If there is anything that the reportage of "blood diamonds"
shows us, it is that child soldiers are not mere footmen that
increase military advantage in the battlefield. They are, in the
final analysis, hidden slaves that embolden and empower
armed groups to sustain hostilities for years. Confronting the
phenomenon of child soldiering must recognize the compel-
ling force of this reality. By making states internationally and
individually responsible for preventing the trade of goods pro-
duced by child soldiers, it is my hope that states will finally
decide to leverage the international economic tools available
to them to concretely realize their international obligations
and duties toward the world's children.
271. See DAVID ROSEN, ARMIES OF THE YOUNG: CHILD SOLDIERS IN WAR AND
TERRORISM 16-18 (2005) (explaining that children are recruited as soldiers
because they are vulnerable and easily manipulated).
272. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
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